History Matters

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For the History Matters family
The History of HISTORY MATTERS
Appalachian State University
Department of History

Have you ever spent so much time and effort on something that you wanted to share it with other people? Have you ever felt unfulfilled receiving only a grade and your own satisfaction as rewards for your hard work? Have you ever wanted to get your work published?

HISTORY MATTERS was founded to meet these needs. In the spring of 2003, Eric Burnette, a freshman, was looking for an outlet—a venue for his research paper. He figured that other students probably felt the same way. Dr. Michael Moore, who edited ALBION, a professional journal of British history, for over twenty-five years, began advising Eric on how to start an academic journal for students. Another student, Matthew Manes, was asked to join the interesting experiment, and together the three laid the groundwork for HISTORY MATTERS.

The journal’s first deadline was in late January 2004. For the editorial staff, it was an extensive and time-consuming process of reading, revising, and communicating with both the authors and the Faculty Editorial Board. In the end, the team accepted one research paper, one research essay, and three editorial book reviews. The first issue of HISTORY MATTERS: An Undergraduate Journal of Historical Research was published on April 28, 2004 at www.historymatters.appstate.edu.

From the beginning, Eric and Matt wanted to expand the journal and provide more students with the opportunity to be published. The 2004-2005 school year saw the participation of the University of North Carolina at Asheville and Western Carolina University, as well as submissions from half a dozen schools nationwide. The 2005 issue was published with two research papers, one from Appalachian State University and one from a student at Villanova University, and five editorial book reviews from all three participating departments.

Since 2004, HISTORY MATTERS has grown drastically. Over the years, the submission base has increased from 11 papers in 2004-05 to more than 110 submissions in 2012-13. The staff now receives submissions from distinguished universities across the United States, including Yale, Harvard, and Stanford. HISTORY MATTERS has also expanded internationally. The journal receives submissions from Canada, South America, and Australia, while also employing international staff members as contributing editors.

HISTORY MATTERS continues to grow and prosper thanks to a supportive faculty, department, university, and most importantly, to the students who have worked hard on their papers and who work diligently with the staff to get them published.
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Union Burning and Confederate Impressment in the Shenandoah Valley

Ross Hawkins

James Madison University
Philip Sheridan's march up and down the Shenandoah Valley during the fall of 1864 involved a destructive force that supposedly left a trail of fire in its wake. “The Burning” of the Valley seems as complete in its destruction as the Romans’ salting of the soil at Carthage. This is the type of “hard war” that Ulysses Grant had in mind when he told Sheridan to “give the enemy no rest… If this war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste.”¹ However, this apparent decimation of resources in the aforementioned area was not as all-encompassing as Union reports suggest, particularly in the case of Augusta County, Virginia. By analyzing the official records of Sheridan’s forces between September 26, 1864, and September 30, 1864, and then comparing those military details with relevant letters, diary entries, and statistics, this Union general’s “Burning” becomes a “flicker” in Augusta County. Sheridan may have tried to depict a completely barren Shenandoah Valley in his reports, but individual accounts about the temporary Union inhabitants in Augusta County detail a noticeably softer description regarding the Union’s actions in the area. Due to this oversight by Sheridan, locals in the Upper Valley actually held greater animosity towards subsequent Confederate impressment agents rather than Union raiders.²

Sheridan’s excursion into the Shenandoah Valley did not mark the first time that Augusta County hosted Union intruders. In early June 1864, Union General David Hunter entered the Upper Valley through Port Republic.³ A small battle occurred around Piedmont, but the only Confederate opposition involved the Augusta County Reserves, which consisted of men over age

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² The term “Upper Valley” can be used to encompass different counties in the Shenandoah Valley. Within the context of this paper, this term will refer to any county south of Rockingham County, within the Shenandoah Valley.
forty-five and boys under age seventeen. General John Breckinridge and his troops, the widely hailed victors of New Market and the supposed defenders of the Shenandoah Valley, were at the time outside of Richmond, reinforcing Lee at the Battle of Cold Harbor. After this substitute Confederate force retreated, Hunter and his Union forces entered Staunton on June 6, 1864. Over the next four days, these Union troops destroyed various industrial operations, local government workshops, and several miles of railroads and telegraph line, and they damaged the printing presses of the two Staunton newspapers. On June 10, 1864, these Union troops left Staunton and continued south toward their main destination of Lexington and the subsequent destruction of Virginia Military Institute. Military engagements were not new to Augusta County by the time Sheridan entered the Shenandoah Valley during September 1864.

This earlier Union expedition of Hunter’s did not illicit the same widespread civilian criticism that characterized Sheridan’s foray, due to the fact that Hunter did not employ “hard war” during his movements through Augusta County. Hunter’s soldiers instead focused on two objectives: the destruction of any opposing Confederate forces and the decommissioning of specific areas of Confederate manufacturing and infrastructure. Citizens of the Shenandoah Valley did not experience the overarching destruction of personal property and the elimination of agricultural resources that distinguished Sheridan’s future “Burning.” The only significant reduction of property involved operations that directly fueled the southern war effort, and even that diminishment of resources centered predominantly within Staunton. These actions only impacted a few local businessmen and entrepreneurs, leaving everyone else—and their property—physically untouched. Hunter’s march through Augusta County was a type of “soft

5 Editorial, Staunton Vindicator, July 8, 1864.
6 MacMaster, 25; Harris, 25.
7 Harris 24, 25.
war,” which gave these Confederate civilians a light precursor to what the Union had planned for the Shenandoah Valley three months in the future.

The Shenandoah Valley constituted a unique area of conquest for all Union troops. Until Sheridan’s campaign, this area of modern-day western Virginia was the burial ground for Union generals’ careers (Hunter being the previously acknowledged exception). The aura surrounding “Stonewall” Jackson’s previous successful exploits in this part of Virginia seemed to extend to his replacements, first Breckinridge and later Jubal Early. Since the Union had seen such limited success in this area, the Valley became part of the “Confederate Frontier.”8 This term refers to regions held by the Confederacy, which nevertheless experienced sporadic raids by Union forces. Augusta County fell well within that frontier, experiencing occasional interference from the Union expeditions; throughout the entirety of the war, this portion of the Upper Valley hosted significant Union troops three different times. In late September 1864, this county witnessed substantial numbers of raiders for the second time, as Sheridan instigated his “Burning” campaign within the Shenandoah Valley.

During the Union’s second invasion, Sheridan and his 26,000 troops marched south up the Valley Pike, through Shenandoah County and Rockingham County, and set up camp at Mount Crawford, located just north of the border between Rockingham County and Augusta County, on September 25, 1864.9 The previously isolated citizens of the Upper Valley now had to contend with a significant Union force as Sheridan and his generals had every intention of turning the grain and wheat capital of the Confederacy into ashes. This complete devastation

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proved elusive in Augusta County as the minimal amount of troops assigned to invade Augusta County did not have time or the resources to complete their task.

Mount Crawford and Port Republic, located on the southwestern border of Rockingham County, served as the launching points for the initial Union forays into Augusta County. When comparing official Union records with local recounts, discrepancies emerge regarding the amount of property destroyed. However, military reports on Union troop movements in the Upper Valley are accurate, as the reported locations of these soldiers largely coincide with the recollections of Augusta County inhabitants. At this time, Sheridan’s main force consisted of the Sixth Army Corps, a detachment of the Nineteenth Corps, the Department of West Virginia, and independent cavalry units. While the infantry remained on the southern edge of Rockingham County, Sheridan sent his cavalry, commanded by Alfred Torbert, southwest into Augusta County. Torbert would have approximately five days to complete the destruction of a county that incorporated 971 square miles and was home to roughly 20,000 free citizens. This considerable task involved two main theaters of action, which consisted entirely of Sheridan’s cavalry forces: the Third Division, with the Reserve Brigade of the First Division, marched up the Valley Pike, while the majority of the First Division marched in the proximity of northeastern Augusta County. The main purpose of these two groups involved eliminating the southern production potential of the “Breadbasket of the Confederacy.”

Due to the higher concentration of resources and population along the Valley Pike, the Union movement up this macadamized road received priority. In order to ensure this primary

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10 “Itinerary of U. S. Forces,” in War of the Rebellion, 63, 90, 93.
objective received appropriate attention, Torbert remained with the 3,000 cavalry troops and moved towards Staunton from Mount Crawford, starting on September 26, 1864. While marching to this epicenter of Augusta County, Torbert focused on the acquisition and destruction of military-based equipment and resources around the Valley Pike. While civilian cattle was not an unusual acquisition, this initial Union advance focused on acquiring or destroying items such as stores of flour and tents, which were left behind by the retreating Confederacy. These actions received little to no resistance because the bulk of Jubal Early’s forces had retreated east through Brown’s Gap or Rockfish Gap of the Blue Ridge Mountains. When the Union leaders ascertained the location of their enemy to be in or behind these mountain passes, Sheridan decided to focus Union efforts on the destruction of Augusta County and the rest of Shenandoah Valley, rather than following and decimating the remaining Confederate forces. Sheridan reasoned that he did not have sufficient enough troops to protect the Orange and Alexandria railway, which would have served as the Union’s primary supply line across the mountains. In addition, since Early and his soldiers had left the Valley, Sheridan’s “Burning” could progress with few enemy distractions. With the backing of Sheridan, Torbert began to focus on the reduction of Confederate supplies and resources, instead of pursuing and eliminating Confederate soldiers outside of the Shenandoah Valley.

Hearing rumors of Early’s absence from the Valley and observing Torbert’s forces on outskirts of Staunton on the eve of September 26, 1864, many Augusta County citizens

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16 Waddell, October 8, 1864; Sheridan, 307.
17 Sheridan, 309.
18 Ibid., 310.
evacuated through Waynesboro and over the Blue Ridge Mountains towards Charlottesville.\textsuperscript{19} The road going through Rockfish Gap became crowded with wagons as residents tried to escape the Union approach.\textsuperscript{20} However, this civilian retreat only entailed individuals with the means to transport their physical property. Most Augusta County citizens chose to stay with their homes and use various other means to protect their possessions. Farmers hid their cattle in surrounding woodland areas, stored hay in their houses’ attics, and squirreled away family valuables in surrounding cornfields.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, some citizens of Augusta County consolidated their funds in anticipation of having to bribe the intrusive Union combatants.\textsuperscript{22} Virtually every citizen of Augusta County took some measure of precaution in securing their worldly possessions from possible Union abduction. However, significant Union involvement in local affairs only started after Torbert entered Staunton.

Destruction of the city’s resources started on September 26, 1864, and continued through September 27, 1864.\textsuperscript{23} General Torbert spent the next twenty-four hours concentrating on eliminating resources that could fuel the Confederate war effort. Union forces either confiscated or destroyed large quantities of hard bread, flour, cattle, and wall tents.\textsuperscript{24} In addition, Union forces focused on the acquisition of tobacco, saddles, bridles, and clothing.\textsuperscript{25} Destruction of resources did not entail merely obliterating items of sustenance and warmth. Union soldiers took the necessary time to ensure their own future safety, eliminating arms, ammunition, and sabers

\textsuperscript{20} Heatwole, 37, 38; Waddell, October 8, 1864.
\textsuperscript{22} Daniel Shreckhise to James Shreckhise, October 17, 1864; Heatwole, 48.
\textsuperscript{23} Charles Lowell to A. Dana, in War of the Rebellion, 491; “Itinerary of U. S. Forces: Reserve Brigade, First Division,” in War of the Rebellion, 94, 95.
\textsuperscript{24} “Itinerary of U. S. Forces: Third Division,” in War of the Rebellion, 99; “Itinerary of U. S. Forces: Reserve Brigade, First Division,” in War of the Rebellion, 95; Charles Lowell to A. Dana, in War of the Rebellion, 491.
\textsuperscript{25} James Wilson to J. Forsyth, February 18, 1865, in War of the Rebellion, 519.
that the Confederates were unable to take with them across the Blue Ridge Mountains.\(^{26}\)

Torbert’s cavalry also decommissioned various industrial operations, as Union forces decommissioned at least two factories in the agrarian city.\(^{27}\) Communication lines and infrastructure received demobilization by the invading cavalry. Since Staunton served as the economic center of Augusta County, Union soldiers decreased the city’s influence. The invading force cut telegraph lines and impressed freed slaves to help destroy several miles of railroad tracks in and around Staunton.\(^{28}\) Torbert seems to have followed Sheridan’s orders perfectly, as he outperformed Hunter’s previous exploits in Staunton in an even shorter amount of time. Sheridan’s top cavalry commander apparently punctured the economic heart of Augusta County and the Shenandoah Valley.\(^{29}\)

Once the apparent decimation of Staunton had reached its climax, Torbert sent a contingent of Union soldiers, under the command of Captain Charles Veil, towards Waynesboro at roughly 4:00 p.m. on September 27, 1864.\(^{30}\) These Union troops established a picket outside of Waynesboro the next day, and began to focus their efforts on the dismantling of the iron Virginia Central Railroad Bridge that spanned the South River.\(^{31}\) This railroad served as a major delivery line for providing General Lee with supplies and troops from the Shenandoah Valley to Richmond. As such, it was a primary target for destruction by the Union troops. In addition, occupying Union forces damaged surrounding government property, including a tannery and

\(^{26}\) Alfred Torbert to J. Forsyth, November, 1864, in *War of the Rebellion*, 429; Heatwole, 34.
\(^{28}\) Charles Lowell to A. Dana, in *War of the Rebellion*, 491; Heatwole, 34; Waddell, October 8, 1864.
\(^{29}\) Editorial, *Staunton Vindicator*, October 21, 1864.
\(^{31}\) “Itinerary of U. S. Forces: Reserve Brigade, First Division,” in *War of the Rebellion*, 95; Heatwole, 36.
various mills, but they focused the majority of their attention on destroying the bridge.\textsuperscript{32} The Blue Ridge Tunnel, which allowed the rail line to cut through Rockfish Gap, was also slated for destruction by these cavalry troops; but due to limited resources and eventual Confederate interference, the tunnel remained intact.\textsuperscript{33} Since Veil’s troops were only a minor subset of Torbert’s main force, these soldiers did not have the military capability to damage the entire surrounding area or to fortify their picket line on the outskirts of Waynesboro.

Recognizing this weak expeditionary Union contingent, Confederate forces, under orders from Early, charged down from the direction of Rockfish Gap to force these intrusive Union troops back towards Staunton.\textsuperscript{34} This Union contingent retreated towards Staunton and arrived in the city after dark on September 28, 1864, only a day after their raid on Waynesboro.\textsuperscript{35} With the bulk of his forces now relocated in Staunton, Torbert decided to make his tactical retreat back down the Valley Pike on September 29, 1864, towards the main Union base at Mount Crawford.\textsuperscript{36} The precautions Augusta County citizens had taken days earlier proved beneficial.

After Early evaluated the situation in Waynesboro, this leading Confederate general saw the enemy’s retreat as a chance to nip at the heels of the Union forces.\textsuperscript{37} However, Torbert used this maneuver as an opportunity to carry out Sheridan and Grant’s desire to make the entire Shenandoah Valley barren of all supportive resources for the Confederate war effort. The cavalry’s retrograde motion back into Rockingham County allowed Union raiders time to burn

\textsuperscript{33} Moore, 96; Tenney, September 28, 1864.
\textsuperscript{34} Moore, 96, 97; Philip Sheridan to Ulysses Grant, Harrisonburg, Virginia, September 29, 1864, in War of the Rebellion, 29; Heatwole, 36.
\textsuperscript{35} Lowell to A. Dana, in War of the Rebellion, 491.
\textsuperscript{36} Tenney, September 29, 1864; “Itinerary of U. S. Forces,” in War of the Rebellion, 95, 99, 102.
\textsuperscript{37} Jubal Early to Robert E. Lee, New Market, Virginia, October 9, 1864, in War of the Rebellion, 556.
local barns, mills, and granaries.\textsuperscript{38} By marking these civilian targets for destruction, Union forces did not necessarily intend to harm innocent bystanders, but rather deprive the Confederate military of additional resources and thereby end the war at a quicker rate. By the time his cavalry exited Augusta County on September 30, 1864, Torbert estimated that he had caused $3,270,000 worth of damage over the course of roughly five days.\textsuperscript{39}

According to official Union records and certain personal recounts by certain Union soldiers, it seems like this expedition by Torbert accomplished all of its main objectives. The \textit{Staunton Vindicator} indicated that Sheridan and Grant had left the Valley, including Augusta County, a “barren waste.”\textsuperscript{40} However, by putting these actions into a wider context and evaluating local viewpoints, a more stable image of Augusta County begins to appear. As such, Torbert focused on the destruction of specific targets, rather than on a thorough and indiscriminate devastation of everything standing in his path.

The reports of Union officers engaged in this Valley raid do not completely reflect the reality of Torbert’s expedition into Augusta County. While engaged in Staunton, Union soldiers occupied their time not only with destruction but with visiting hospitals and asylums as well. When Early and his troops evacuated east, primarily into Brown’s Gap, they were unable to take the supplies and injured soldiers that were still in Staunton with them. As such, many of the Union soldiers took some time to visit their temporarily abandoned injured rivals in the local hospital, located within the city. This communication stemmed from the respect that the invasive cavalry felt for their wounded enemy. Conversely, the invading soldiers also visited the Deaf and Dumb Asylum and the Western Virginia Lunatic Asylum in order to observe the peculiar

\textsuperscript{38} “Itinerary of U. S. Forces: Reserve Brigade, First Division,” in \textit{War of the Rebellion}, 95; Heatwole, 37.
\textsuperscript{39} Heatwole, 42.
\textsuperscript{40} Editorial, \textit{Staunton Vindicator}, October 21, 1864.
residents. While Torbert ensured that necessary time was dedicated to the destruction of Augusta County, Sheridan’s subsequent “Burning” also involved a bit of personal exploration by the Union soldiers.

Among other areas of Torbert’s oversight, surrounding infrastructure remained largely intact. While in Staunton, Union troops had a tough time getting local freed slaves to help destroy the railroad tracks. Since they would have to rebuild the rail line once Union troops left the city, these freed slaves were lethargic in their dismantling of the tracks. In addition, when given the option to go north with Torbert’s forces, the vast majority of the freed slaves declined, not wishing to uproot their lives and communal relations. This same disinterest characterized the freed slaves that helped with the destruction of the iron bridge in Waynesboro. Despite official Union reports indicating that this iron bridge across the South River received substantial damage, Captain Veil’s forces and apathetically impressed freed slaves only inflicted minimal impairment on the bridge before retreating from Early’s oncoming Confederate forces. Local descriptions of the surrounding railways contradict Sheridan’s assessment of how effective his cavalry had been in this area of the Shenandoah Valley. By October 2, 1864, Rebel forces had repaired the bridge enough to transfer troops and resources back into the Augusta County from

41 Tenney, September 27, 1864.
42 Waddell, October 8, 1864.
44 George Hawke, A History of Waynesboro: to 1900 (Waynesboro Historical Society Commission, 1997), 114.
46 Sheridan, 307.
the other side of Rockfish Gap. Augusta County’s influence still spanned across Virginia despite Torbert’s perceived efforts.

Not all of Sheridan’s efforts in the Shenandoah Valley involved complete exaggeration. Torbert’s movement back into Rockingham County from Staunton is the closest thing to a “Burning” that characterized this general’s movements in Augusta County, but even these actions presented a subdued tone. The 3,000 retreating Union troops had less than twenty-four hours to deplete the resources of the northern half of the county, which incorporated roughly 400 square miles. In addition, Union raiding parties had even less time to engage in the destruction of local resources due to the advancing Confederate forces from the south. Their efforts concentrated around mills next to rivers and areas directly adjacent to the Valley Pike, which connected Staunton and Mount Crawford. When Torbert eventually marched back into Mount Crawford, local Augusta County citizens and surrounding Confederate soldiers had a chance to evaluate the damage, and the consensus was that it could have been worse.

As the dust settled, local and Confederate accounts of the aftermath of the unwanted intrusion seemed almost indifferent when compared to official Union records. George Neese, a Confederate soldier in the Horse Artillery who was returning through Rockfish Gap into Augusta County, commented in his diary, “Waynesboro is a pretty little town situated on the west side of the South River and in a good country of fine, productive land.” This is hardly the description that one would expect from an area that the Union had supposedly made barren. In many of the local informal records of the Union raid, a very mundane description is given. Staunton resident Francis McFarland’s only entry in his diary on September 27, 1864, reads: “The Enemy still in

48 Moore, 122, 123; Waddell, October 8, 1864.
49 Neese, October 2, 1864.
Staunton. Pickets out.”50 He comments on September 29, 1864, that “the enemy’s cavalry came back through Staunton, & took the road to Spring Hill—were routed.”51 To many citizens of Augusta County, the Union invasion became just a heightened annoyance; an unwanted interruption to these locals’ usual routine.

While written accounts do reflect an almost uninterested attitude, the most compelling argument for the apathy of civilians regarding Sheridan’s forces in the Upper Valley is that most Augusta County citizens did not write about this Union invasion. The University of Virginia’s The Valley of the Shadow project digitally transcribed nearly every known letter, diary, and newspaper created by the citizens and soldiers of Augusta County throughout the Civil War.52 While certain sources are lost to time, this project preserved all accessible recounts. Among these first-hand accounts, few individuals directly reference witnessing Union troop movements, and when Augusta County residents do mention any sort of Union aggression, citizens usually remember these destructive acts as second-hand information. While Torbert’s expedition may have been subdued, Sheridan’s other outreaching excursion, in northeastern Augusta County, was a bit more effective.

While Torbert escorted the main Union forces up and down the Valley Pike, Brigadier General Wesley Merrit and Brigadier General George Custer spent the last days of September 1864 disrupting the northeastern corner of Augusta County. However, Custer and Merrit first had to contend with lingering Confederate forces. Operating from Port Republic of Rockingham County, initial Union raids into Augusta County on September 27, 1864, met with resistance as

51 McFarland, September 29, 1864.
Confederate troops descended from Brown’s gap and pushed Merrit and Custer’s troops back into Rockingham County. After this offensive victory, Early decided to head south along the Blue Ridge Mountains and route Torbert’s troops in Waynesboro, rather than pursue the currently retreating Union forces. On September 28, 1864, after discovering that Early’s forces had marched south, Merritt and Custer set up camp at Cross Keys and once again made plans to invade Augusta County.

With the withdrawal of Confederate forces, the second branch of Sheridan’s “Burning” could now commence south of Rockingham County. Starting on September 29, 1864, Union cavalry marched through Port Republic and entered the Piedmont region of Augusta County. Even though these particular Union forces spread out all over this area of the Upper Valley, their overall movements resembled a U-shaped design. Roughly speaking, Merritt and Custer’s forces moved south through Port Republic to New Hope, then west towards Fort Defiance, heading north along the Valley Pike into Weyers Cave and then reentering Rockingham County through Mount Crawford on September 30, 1864. While eliminating the resources found in this region of Augusta County, Union cavalry stayed above an imaginary line stretching from Verona to Crimora. Merrit and Custer only had a day in which to complete this destructive march through Augusta County, but their presence did not go unnoticed by these local residents.

What differentiated Merrit and Custer’s movement into Augusta County from Torbert’s mission is that northeastern Augusta County was principally agrarian, which mostly contained small farms and largely lacked railroads, bridges, and government supplies. As a result, these

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53 Peyton, 239; Moore 94; Wesley Merritt to William Russell Jr., October 5, 1864, in War of the Rebellion, 442, 443.
54 Merritt to William Russell Jr., October 5, 1864, in War of the Rebellion, 442, 443.
56 “Itinerary of the U. S. Forces: First Brigade, First Division and Second Brigade, First Division,” in War of the Rebellion, 90, 93.
57 Heatwole, 43, 45; “Itinerary of the U. S. Forces: First Brigade, First Division and Second Brigade, First Division,” in War of the Rebellion, 90, 93.
58 MacMaster, 26; Heatwole, 45.
local non-combatants suffered at a higher rate than individuals in other areas of Augusta County. Barns, various mills, stores of food, cattle, and similar resources experienced a high concentration of destruction; resources along the Middle River received the largest degree of decimation. In addition, the few industrial based resources in the area received special attention from Union soldiers, as a locally owned iron furnace and various threshing machines were decommissioned. Even though northeastern Augusta County only hosted Union troops for one day, Merritt and Custer made a lasting impression during their twenty-four hour visit.

While Merritt and Custer inflicted significant damage to locally owned resources in Augusta County, this devastation was still minimal when compared to other areas of the Shenandoah Valley. As Sheridan marched back down the Valley Pike, Rockingham County’s assets received enhanced diminishment by Union troops. As Jedediah Hotchkiss commented, “They [the Union] did but little damage in Augusta County; burned a few barns and mills in the lower end of the county, but in Rockingham they have done a vast amount of damage.” Even though Merritt and Custer focused on the reduction of civilian agricultural resources, locals acknowledged that even northeastern Augusta County escaped the personal destruction experienced in Rockingham County and other areas of the Valley.

By analyzing the numbers and testimonies during or immediately after Sheridan’s cavalry expedition into Augusta County, the limited impact that the Union actually had in the area becomes apparent. Additionally, this ineffectiveness also exists when one examines the

60 MacMaster, 26; Heatwole, 49.
descriptions associated with this Upper Valley County during the weeks and months after the Union cavalry had left Augusta County. If Sheridan and his generals had been as complete in their decimation as their accounts reflect, then these Confederate civilians would not have had the resources or problems that are prevalent in their subsequent accounts. Furthermore, if mass starvation ever occurred directly after the exodus of Union troops from the Upper Valley, it was due to labor shortages, which impeded the timely practices of the autumn harvest season.

Given that the Shenandoah Valley was the “Breadbasket of the Confederacy,” one of Sheridan’s primary targets during his “Burning” campaign was the elimination of wheat and grain within this region of Virginia. Torbert, Merrit, and Custer all report having destroyed various amounts of these resources within Augusta County.\(^63\) Despite these recounts, there was still a sufficient amount of wheat and subsequent flour to fulfill the basic diets of the citizens.\(^64\) While grains experienced some diminishment, corn and hay were still in such profusion that there were not enough residents left in the county to harvest these resources in an adequate amount of time.\(^65\) Aware of this problem, Confederate soldiers from this county attempted to gain passes in order to return home temporarily and help with the harvest. These requests usually fell on deaf ears from their superiors.\(^66\) Sheridan’s soldiers damaged the grain capital of the Confederacy, but not enough to leave the citizens of Augusta County completely devoid of these resources.

Wheat and other grains were not the only agricultural resource to escape the Union cavalry, as certain farm animals remained in significant numbers throughout Augusta County.

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\(^63\) Alfred Torbert to J. Forsyth, November, 1864, in *War of the Rebellion*, 429; Merritt to William Russell Jr., October 5, 1864, in *War of the Rebellion*, 443.

\(^64\) John Hildebrand, October 22, 1864 and October 24, 1864.


Unlike cows and sheep, who were organized within fenced areas, and thus easy to identify and confiscate, pigs were more solitary creatures that spent most of their time in wooded areas until slaughter season. Subsequently, citizens found that their swine had largely escaped Sheridan’s cavalry. Similarly, poultry found sanctuary in Augusta County as chickens and turkeys did not diminish in any significant amount. As with attempting to thresh wheat and hay, Confederate soldiers asked for leave in order to butcher their animals, but again received no reprieve from their superior officers. While cattle experienced reduction, smaller animals were not a primary object of Sheridan’s “Burning.”

This county of the Shenandoah Valley was left so untouched that many locals were able to donate supplies to the Confederacy. After receiving a care package of bread and butter, John Dull commented that “You sent more butter than I thought I could [sic, could] use, so I Spared one of the role. Sold two pound of it…. John’s wife Giney sent him so much food that John was able to sell some of the surplus. As late as February 1865, Augusta County as a whole still had enough resources to contribute significant supplies to the Confederate war effort. At a meeting in Staunton on February 27, 1865, sixty-five county citizens contributed more than 100 barrels of flour, 8,000 pounds of meat, and $100,000 in government bonds. Once again, Sheridan’s actual ineffectiveness overpowers the common misconception regarding the complete destruction of the entire Shenandoah Valley. If he and his officers had been as thorough as their reports indicate, then these resources would never have been available, especially this late in the

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68 John Hildebrand, October 31, 1864.
69 John P. Dull to Giney Dull, December 1, 1864.
71 Blair, 132.
course of the war. Subsequently, civilians would not have been less willing to donate these large amounts of personal resources to the military if their own needs were not satisfied.

When put within a larger context, the “Burning” seems to have simply resulted in an inconvenience for individuals living in the Upper Valley, where overall destruction never reached a fraction of what Union officers reported. However, there was a threat to the agricultural resources of Augusta County that was a lot closer to home than any Union cavalry raid. Confederate impressment agents became an ever present threat to the agricultural supplies of Augusta County. After Sheridan swept back towards Winchester, Jubal Early wrote to Lee that “he [Sheridan] has laid waste nearly all of Rockingham and Shenandoah, and I will have to rely on Augusta for my supplies.”

By clearly identifying this county as having received significantly less of a beating during Sheridan’s exploits Augusta County had their goods and resources appropriated in larger quantities than the rest of the Shenandoah Valley.

Unlike Union raiders, who only appeared for an isolated amount of time, Confederate impressment agents presented an omnipotent threat to civilian food supplies. While Augusta County civilians largely retained enough resources to last the upcoming winter, the surrounding Confederate troops lacked the appropriate goods to survive. In a published statement in the Staunton Vindicator, Early declares, “The Army must be fed. The people have the means to do it.”

This harsh language mirrored the intensity in which Confederate soldiers absconded with local resources. Depending on the size of a farm and family, Augusta County citizens needed to sell the government certain amounts of resources, such as corn, wheat, hay, and straw.

However, this standardized acquisition of personal property soon devolved into a succession of

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72 Jubal Early to Robert E. Lee, New Market, Virginia, October 9, 1864, in War of the Rebellion, 560.
73 Editorial, Staunton Vindicator, January 6, 1865.
unorganized abductions of resources by Confederate impressment agents. Ginnie Ott lamented “We have had a great deal of trouble with army agents[.]. They are here nearly every day after something,” indicating an incessant pressure for civilians to contribute to the Confederate war effort. In certain situations, the supposed impressment of goods became mere looting by Confederate soldiers. Even military leaders within the Confederacy recognized the intensity in which impressment agents descended upon Augusta County; Jedidiah Hotchkiss instructed his wife Sara to “Get all your flour home as soon as you can,” as “the government will get it all any way.” As the war continued to progress, citizens of Augusta County now had to safeguard their resources from their supposed protectors, as well as any future Union advances.

The Confederate raids on personal resources involved not only stripping locals of their products but also failing to provide appropriate monetary compensation. When confiscating assets, Confederate agents paid only a fraction of the estimated price. When writing to her Uncle Enos Ott, Hannah acknowledged “the people not being willing to sell for gov’t price when they can get so much more selling to individuals.” While citizens in Augusta County largely supported the cause of the Confederacy, that faith did not override monetary survival. So citizens not only had their resources taken from them by their own government, but they also did not even receive enough money to make up for the loss of property. By unintentionally leaving Augusta County intact, Sheridan caused locals to view their previous Confederate protectors as enemies to their sustenance of life.

Grant’s “hard war” involved destroying every possible resource that could supply the Confederacy. While this definition did reference industrial products such as canons and rifles, it

75 Ginnie Ott to Enos Ott, December 1, 1864.
76 Hawke, 116.
77 Jedidiah Hotchkiss to Sara A. Hotchkiss, October 2, 1864.
also encompassed agricultural goods. With this mindset, Grant sent Sheridan into the Shenandoah Valley to burn the entire area to the ground. However, while this was the expectation, it was never the reality, especially in Augusta County. Even though Torbert went up the Valley Pike to Staunton, Waynesboro, and eventually Rockingham County, this cavalry force simply did not have the time or the manpower to produce the total destruction of resources in the Upper Valley. Instead, these intrusive Union forces focused on key military and government property, and civilian resources that were close to these localities. In addition, Merritt and Custer’s expedition into northeastern Augusta County, while more destructive to civilian resources, still did not meet the ideal set forth by Grant and Sheridan. After the Union eventually left Augusta County at the end of September 1864, physical damage seemed minimal and most locals still had enough resources to survive and continue to fuel the Confederate army at Petersburg with goods. However, this oversight by Sheridan resulted in Augusta County having to contribute more than its fair share of resources to Confederate soldiers, as Confederate impressment agents visited homes in this area more often than those located in the Lower Valley. Sheridan’s “Burning” never fully encompassed Augusta County, and while this reprieve from destruction may have seemed like a blessing, it actually caused citizens to fear Confederate impressment agents more than Union cavalry raids during the remainder of the war.
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Silvia Mejia

Emory University
“Because of the political turmoil in their country, El Salvadorans are suffering a crucifixion comparable to that of Christ.”

Sister Magee Cappelli, 1981

On March 24, 1980, Archbishop of El Salvador, Oscar Romero, was celebrating mass in a small chapel of San Salvador. Shortly after he had finished his homily and had begun blessing the Eucharist, a shot was fired. The bullet hit Romero in his chest near his heart. Witness Teresa Alas describes, “I heard a shot. Just one. Maybe it was because it hit so close to the microphone but it sounded like a bomb exploding. Then people started screaming.” People rushed to help, but there was little they could do; the wound was fatal. He passed away minutes after arriving at the hospital. This event caught national and international attention, as Archbishop Romero had become a spokesperson for peace in El Salvador, a country in the throes of war. After his death, his congregation realized that a sniper who was working for a right-wing death squad had shot him. Romero had received numerous threats, but nevertheless kept speaking on behalf of his people, whose rights, integrity, and equality he championed.

Romero had put his life on the line because El Salvador was home to some of the poorest people in the world, despite being one of the richest countries in natural resources. Without access to land, Salvadorans could not grow food to support themselves, leading to more deaths and a lower life expectancy. In 1980, El Salvador had the lowest life expectancy at birth in Latin America, 56.6 years. Inequality and misery prompted peasant rebellions and the formation of a guerilla army, which eventually led to civil war in 1980, between the national army backed by the oligarchy and the communist guerillas. The United States intervened in the conflict by supporting the oligarchy and sending more than 4.7 billion dollars in military aid to finance the military aid.

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war. War enveloped the country for twelve years and left more than 75,000 Salvadorans dead.\textsuperscript{81} One prominent example of U.S.-supported killing was the death of Archbishop Oscar Romero in March of 1980. An examination of primary sources reveals how the United States ignored its professed commitment to human rights and was involved in the death of Archbishop Romero. An aggressive Cold War foreign policy and ideological goals led the United States to support this crime even though Romero was not a violent insurgent. The U.S. government’s motivation was preventing the spread of communism and in turn assuring continued access to El Salvador’s resources.

It is important to understand the difference between the clergy who worked closely with peasants, and the institutional Catholic Church that had been a power since the Spanish conquest. The institutional Church was complicit in legitimizing inequality in El Salvador. During the 1950s, the Second Vatican Council met with the aim to create a church open to renewal and change, a clear bid to keep pace with modernity. Vatican II functioned as a catalyst for the articulation of liberation theology in Latin America, which grew out of this Catholic context and gained prominence a decade later.\textsuperscript{82} This theology viewed God as a liberator who was interested in people’s present lives as well as their afterlives; it understood the divine as a liberator of bodies as well as souls. The focal point of this theology was Jesus, who was conceived as a resister of suffering and oppression.\textsuperscript{83} Local church leaders became an essential part in the shaping of the movement through activism and social justice efforts. This movement sought to liberate the layperson from the effects of imperialism and neo-colonialism. Clergy members

\textsuperscript{83} Ricardo Urioste in The Murder of Monseñor, directed by Daniel Freed, 2005.
grounded their theology in Jesus’ social justice teachings, ideas that seemed evident to them in the gospel.

As liberation theology took hold in Latin America by the early 1970s, Pope John Paul II began to see this theology as distorting Christianity and turning it into a secular movement that was not grounded in faith. Liberation theology was criticized for being too political, communist, and materialistic. According to the Pope, this new theology was robbing Jesus’ power to transform everyday life. He asserted that portraying Jesus as a revolutionary was inaccurate and against the Church’s dogma. He said the following in 1990 to priests who supported liberation theology: “...Be careful, then, not to accept nor allow a Vision of human life as conflict nor ideologies which propose class hatred and violence to be instilled in you; this includes those which try to hide under theological writings.”

The United States saw liberation theology as a disruptive movement as well. In 1989, an American Military Analyst in Central America wrote the following memorandum for the CIA: “Staunch proponents of Liberation Theology—which attempts to merge traditional Catholic doctrine and Marxist dogma—were responsible for the education of several guerilla leaders during the 1960’s and 1970’s.”

Although some priests did believe that social change could occur through a communist system, many did not. Instead, they espoused ideals of equality that were wrongly construed as Marxism. The U.S. branded all priests and nuns who advocated for social change as “communists.” This was a strategy used to justify the violence committed against the Archbishop Romero. Systematic war crimes against the clergy were especially perplexing during the civil war. The U.S.-trained army could and did justify killing people for associating with the godless

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84 Pope John Paul II, 'Option for the Poor' sermon in Mexico, 1990.
and violent communists aligned with Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN). However, the only way for the U.S to rationalize the killings, rapes, and torture of countless clergy members who supported non-violent opposition to the dehumanization and degradation of fellow Salvadorans during the civil war was to depict priests and nuns as atheistic Marxists.

The clergy’s crime was refusing to accept the grinding squalor that defined their parishioners’ lives. Poverty in El Salvador can be described in two words: land inequality. Since its colonization, only privileged people had access to land. El Salvador was marked by the complete expropriation of communal Indian and ladino lands. At least sixty percent of Salvadorans depended on land for a living, but fewer than two percent, the “Fourteen Families,” maintained control of it. Throughout the twentieth century, El Salvador was solely sustained by agriculture and exportation. Coffee had been introduced in the nineteenth century, and by 1920, eighty percent of the nation’s income came from the exportation of coffee. Landowners benefitted most from the cultivation and exportation of coffee, and in turn, with their inordinate wealth, they dominated Salvadoran politics and monopolized key parts of the economy.

The oligarchy’s tight control compounded with the Great Depression only led to more detrimental circumstances for peasants. El Salvador was severely affected by the economic depression in 1929. As a result, ideas of communism began to circulate. Capitalism, just as Lenin and Marx had predicted, was in its death throes because of the conditions the working classes were forced to endure. In 1932, Salvadoran, Agustin Farabundo Marti formed the Central American Socialist Party, which first took root in Nicaragua. The FMLN rallied support from

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87 Hector Perez-Brignoli, *A Brief History of Central America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 118. *Ladino* is a racial category that usually refers to people of Spanish and Indigenous descent, otherwise known as *mestizo*. The term is most commonly used in Central America.
poor and indigenous people against the government’s oppression. In that same year, a peasant rebellion that demanded a more equal distribution of land ended in a blood bath when the armed forces came to the area and massacred over twenty-five thousand indigenous people. This rebellion came to be known as *La Matanza* and proved that the oligarchy could not control the country as easily as it had in the past. This episode marked the beginning of decades of political instability and tension between the working class and the oligarchy in El Salvador. It seemed clear that the oligarchy could no longer hold peaceful control of the country because the working classes began to demand an end to their subjugation. By 1974, the top one percent of the population in El Salvador had more wealth than the bottom fifty percent of the population.\(^90\) The Catholic Church monopolized Salvadoran religion with seventy-six percent of Salvadorans identifying as Catholic in 1980.\(^91\) The Church became a dominant force in shaping Salvadoran politics and the appropriation of resources. The Catholic Church and government worked together to maintain privilege and power in the hands of a few.\(^92\)

The Americans believed revolution would occur in El Salvador because of these political conditions.\(^93\) The rising influence of the Sandinista party in Nicaragua and other organizations that had formed in the 1970s led to suspicion that El Salvador was ripening for revolution.\(^94\) Each time a military regime was defeated and there was a glimpse of hope for democratization, it was squashed by the oligarchy.\(^95\) The first organization that was formed to defeat the oligarchy

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\(^90\) LaFeber, 243.


\(^92\) Perez-Brignoli, 118.


came not from peasants but from people who lived in the cities. In the 1960s, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was formed, supported by the Catholic Church and Alliance for Progress. It advocated for democracy; the country was hopeful with the promise of a system that would give everyone a voice. This hope did not last. In 1972, the oligarchy rigged the elections and the PDC candidate lost and was exiled. Colonel Arturo Molina came to power, a figurehead of the oligarchy and military. In 1978, under President Carlos Romero, the military set out to destroy the PDC, especially targeting student demonstrations at the National University and peasants who joined unions. This repression was all possible because of U.S. funding for weapons and military training at the School of the Americas. The oligarchy and U.S. government funded death squads to vanish, kill, and torture people for being involved in movements that could be considered communist. Eventually, the PDC disintegrated, and its failure led to further political polarization of the country. Former members of the PDC joined communist guerilla armies to realize their objectives.

To understand U.S. involvement in the Salvadoran Civil War, one must also understand the aggressive U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. The United States believed it was locked in a winner-take-all battle with the Soviet Union for the heart and soul of the developing world. In 1947, when President Harry Truman laid out the Truman Doctrine, he set the foundation for U.S. Cold War foreign policy. In an address to Congress, he depicted a Manichean world of good and evil with only the might of the United States able to keep nations from plunging into the abyss of communism and tyranny,

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life…one way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and it is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees on individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political

96 LaFeber, 244.
97 Ibid., 245.
oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections and the suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.98

President Truman provided a glimpse of the dangers of communism, which affected the American perception of communism for the rest of the Cold War. Robert Kagan, who worked for the State Department during the Reagan administration, said, “The U.S. sought to win the domestic battle for the American soul as well as the strategic battle against the Soviet Union.”99

On the other hand, Ambler Moss, the U.S. ambassador to Panama in 1980, said, “What we see in Central America today would not be much different if the USSR and Castro did not exist.”100

This presents a paradox about the reasons for the U.S. involvement in El Salvador. Historians have debated this topic of U.S. motivations mainly from the perspectives of ideological or economic aims. While some believe U.S. intervention was about ideology, others point to U.S. economic interests motivated by El Salvador’s natural resources as the primary motivation for intervention. However, seeing the U.S. involvement in different countries as purely driven by economics during the Cold War paints a one-dimensional picture and does not account for all U.S. participation.101

In the case of El Salvador, both economic interests and a fear of communism shaped U.S. intervention. The U.S. dreaded that its established economic system of trade and free market were threatened by the rise of communism and a Soviet-led autarky. The U.S. saw its instituted economic system of trade and a free market threatened by the rise of communism. The American

100 LaFeber, 5.
101 This theory does not account for U.S. intervention in areas where there is not a driving economic concern, such as Vietnam or Somalia.
government, therefore, adopted an aggressive foreign policy in order to prevent the spread of Soviet influence. The U.S. did this even though it contradicted the Truman Doctrine and actually aligned with the minority regime that relied upon “terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.”

Prior to the Cold War, the United States had not intervened in El Salvador. U.S. economic interests in El Salvador were limited to coffee and banana exports, which were made readily available to Americans by the Salvadoran oligarchy. However, during the Cold War, El Salvador became one of the longest and most expensive anti-communist projects. Economic interests were not important enough to be the only motivating factor for the U.S. to intervene in the Salvadoran civil war and spend over four billion dollars. The U.S. was deeply involved because of the Cold War and the fear of a communist bloc forming in Central America and the Caribbean. This fear was compounded by the long enmity between the USSR and the U.S., which led directly into the Cold War. The combination of resources and the Cold War tensions led to the hyperbolic response to the struggle for freedom in El Salvador.

During the Reagan administration, the importance of ideology began to gain momentum; according to Reagan, the U.S. had lost Vietnam because it had not intervened early enough in the conflict. His administration identified El Salvador, Iran, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua as examples of Soviet aggression, as proxy battles that must be fought in order to win the war against the Soviets. Anything that seemed even slightly communist would be repressed, persecuted, and annihilated. Episodes of aggressive U.S. intervention occurred upon the slightest suspicion of support for communism. In 1981, one event, which gained international coverage, was the killing

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of 1,000 people (160 of whom where under the age of six) in a village called El Mozote, by a U.S.-trained battalion. The U.S. State Department suspected that people in this small town were communist and supported the FMLN. Everyone was killed indiscriminately without any further investigation to the claim. The authorities of El Salvador and the United States denied the event occurred, even though journalists from the New York Times uncovered mass graves shortly after that confirmed the massacre did take place. El Salvador endured many similar episodes during the years to come.

As an Archbishop during the civil war, Romero took it upon himself to denounce crimes against innocent Salvadorans like the massacre at El Mozote. He censured all forms of violence in his country regardless of the faction or political ideology behind the repression. One of his contemporaries, Archbishop Ricardo Urioste, stated in an interview: “His [Romero’s] homilies were aimed at representing the realities of the country. For Archbishop Romero, human rights were divine rights, that is why he gave his life for his people.” In one of Romero’s homilies in 1977, he clarified the position of the Church on politics:

The church is interested in the rights of man. The mother church is interested in any life that is in danger…those who cannot speak, those who suffer, those who are tortured quietly are of interest to the church…the church has a right to speak its word of moral orientation. Some would say it is Marxism…but the Church is preaching social justice, equality, and dignity of men, defending he who suffers, he who is trampled; it is not subversion, it is not Marxism.

105 Interview with Archbishop Ricardo Urioste in San Salvador on July 29, 2012 at the Fundacion Oscar Romero.
106 Archbishop Oscar Romero, Homily given on May 8, 1977, 59. Original text: La iglesia no hace política, pero cuando la política toca su altar, la iglesia defiende su altar. Los derechos del hombre le interesan a la iglesia. La vida en peligro le interesa a la madre iglesia. Las madres que sufren están en el corazón de la iglesia en este momento. Los que no pueden hablar, los que sufren, los que son torturados, callados le interesan a la iglesia. No es hacer política…y la iglesia tiene el derecho de hablar su palabra de orientación moral. Se diría que Marxism pero la iglesia esta predicando la justicia social, la igualdad y la dignidad de los hombres, defendiendo al que sufre, al que es atropellado, no es subversión, no es Marxismo.
In another homily, Romero proclaimed his non-violent approach to social change: “The violence we preach is not violence of the sword, the violence of hatred. It is the violence of love, of brotherhood, the violence that wills to beat weapons into sickles for work.”

In 1979, the United States first became wary of the progressive and outspoken Salvadoran Archbishop. In that same year, the U.S. Ambassador in El Salvador, Robert White sent a confidential communication warning the State Department of Archbishop Romero’s advocacy for land reform. While Archbishop Romero was trying to prevent a burgeoning civil war, White only saw a communist in the making. White warned the State Department that Romero was preaching words of subversion. Romero stated that a popular army was being formed in order to demand land reform. He cited the Medellin Council of 1968 to justify the right of the oppressed to exert pressure, but not through armed violence. Prompted by Vatican II, this council set in motion liberation theology in Latin America. Latin American clergy from Brazil, Uruguay, Peru, and other countries met and created a cohesive social justice-oriented theology for Latin America. Archbishop Romero’s support for social pressure tactics by the poor was a turning point for the way the U.S. State Department perceived him.

Unaware that the Americans had begun to think of him as a radical, a firebrand, and enemy despite the clerical collar, Archbishop Oscar Romero pleaded with President Jimmy Carter in February 1980 to stop sending military aid to the army. Romero wrote,

The contribution of your government instead of promoting greater justice and peace in El Salvador will without a doubt sharpen the injustice and repression against the organizations of the people which repeatedly have been struggling to gain respect for their most fundamental human rights.

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107 Homily given on November 27, 1977.
109 Ibid.
Archbishop Romero was seen as a threat to the legitimacy of the Salvadoran Junta because he denounced crimes nationally and internationally. His use of the words “human rights violations” gained the attention of Amnesty International and other similar organizations. A month later, an unidentified sniper killed Archbishop Romero. The death of Romero devastated the country. It seemed as if the only hope for the country had literally been killed. Action groups and civilians pressured the government to bring those responsible for the Archbishop’s death to justice.

After much pressure, the government began to investigate the crime. During a government raid on a death squad meeting in May 1980, documents surfaced that implicated Major Roberto D’Abuisson and his chief of security, Alvaro Saravia, in the assassination of the Archbishop.111 D’Abuisson and others were arrested, a move that unleashed a wave of terrorist attacks in the country. Institutional pressures eventually culminated in the release of D’Abuisson.112 On February 1981, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in Panama sent a communication to the U.S. Department of State; the ambassador detailed a report that was later transmitted by Radio Venceremos. In the cable, the ambassador described a journal that the investigators found, which detailed what the death squad would need in order to kill Archbishop Romero. This list included “a machine gun, a sniper, a car, and grenades.”113 When Judge Atilio Ramirez Amaya was appointed to lead the investigation of Romero’s murder, he pointed to D’Abuisson and the armed forces as the culprits. As a result, Ramirez’s house was machine-gunned and his family received death threats, which prompted Ramirez and his family to flee the country.114 After the investigating judge of the case fled, the government refused to investigate

Romero’s death any further. The government placed the police in charge of the “mock investigation,” in order to appease the public.115

In the U.S., news broke out about the violent death of Archbishop Romero. In a press briefing in May 1980, one of the journalists asked the U.S. State Department about the continued financial assistance to El Salvador after the death of Archbishop Romero. The journalist mentioned the letter that Archbishop Romero sent to President Carter warning him of the effects this aid would have in the future of El Salvador. The Secretary of State answered, “We considered Romero’s letter carefully but thought sending more military aid to support the Junta would be the best way to avoid a civil war.”116 Even two months after the Archbishop’s death, the United States was still sending aid.

Two years later, in May 1982, one of the journalists in a daily U.S. press briefing on foreign policy in El Salvador asked what the United States’ position was in the conflict. The Secretary of State indicated that the U.S. supported peaceful democratization of the country but would not allow for a bi-partisan solution with the FMLN. The journalist asked several times if that was a realistic position—that an agreement be reached without a dialogue between the FMLN and the Junta—but the Secretary of State stood his ground, repeatedly declaring that a dialogue with the left would only divide the country.117 His comments reveal that the U.S. was not consistent with its foreign policy toward El Salvador during the Salvadoran civil war. At times, its policies were laissez-faire, and at others, it held tight control of Salvadoran politics in order to shape any dialogue about the democratization of the country. The U.S. State Department changed its course of action and attitude toward the small Central American country, depending

115 FBIS Chiva to FBIS Washington, DC, “El Salvador Army Officers Implicated in Romero Killing.”
on the agency or individual that inquired about its role there. Secretary of State George P. Shultz contradicted himself several times when he articulated the necessary level of involvement in El Salvador and the required actions that the U.S. government needed to take.

The killing of Romero was a particularly egregious example of the refusal to take responsibility, to put pressure on assassins, or to allow the Salvadoran people to determine their destiny. In 1984, Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) sent a letter to Secretary of State Shultz inquiring about the U.S. government’s inaction in the investigation of the Archbishop’s death. A month later, Shultz responded by stating that there was no evidence implicating anyone due to “contradictory” information. The Secretary of State also claimed that Salvadorans needed to make their judicial systems work; ignoring the fact, of course, that the U.S. supply of a range of war material, the training of government troops, and the stamp of approval for massacres, torture, assassinations, had created a culture of impunity that undermined the very judiciary Shultz blamed for its lack of effectiveness. The Secretary of State accused Specter of being “overly prescriptive” with the situation in El Salvador. In other words, it had been about three years since the U.S. had received conclusive information about those implicated in Romero’s assassination, but because of its fear of communism and its blinding ideological stance during the Cold War, nothing was done to avenge the death of El Salvador’s beloved Archbishop and martyr.

After Romero’s death, Bishop Arturo Rivera y Damas succeeded him. Damas continued the legacy left by Romero of denunciation of crimes and human rights advocacy. However, given the way his friend Romero had been killed, he was not an open advocate of land reform or other socialist policies. Damas chose to stay at the margins of the conflict and limit his support for

mass organizations; he was not as open in his support of action groups as Romero had been. When the civil war ended in 1992, Damas played an important role in the peace accords and negotiation between the FMLN and the government.\textsuperscript{119}

In 2004, Romero’s murder case was reopened when the Center for Justice and Accountability reported that Alvaro Saravia was living in the United States. Ambassador Robert White declared that it was important to bring those responsible to justice because the United States had been so deeply involved with the death squads. The judge in the United States heard the evidence including the testimony of the sniper’s driver, and declared the sniper guilty of the assassination of Archbishop Romero. In November, Saravia fled before an arrest warrant could be issued against him.\textsuperscript{120} The fact that his death was not resolved means that Salvadorans have not had closure for the death of their Archbishop. The unpunished crime left people with distrust in their government even today, thirty-two years after the Archbishop’s death.

In 1981, Ambassador Robert White was dismissed from his post in El Salvador after he refused to continue advocating for military aid during the Reagan administration.\textsuperscript{121} He gave his testimony about the futile effects of military aid on El Salvador before The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations:

The recent deaths of the four American Church women and the execution of about 5,000 leftists and persons merely suspected of being leftists show that the chief killer of Salvadorans is the government national security forces. The present government is perfectly capable of handling the situation without U.S. military aid. The communist guerrillas in El Salvador have always been misanalyzed by the Pentagon.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{120} Declaration in court on July, 2004 by Ambassador White, \textit{The Murder of Monseñor}, Daniel Freed, documentary.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
White’s testimony did not stop the influx of U.S. military aid into El Salvador. The United States continued to send money until the end of the war in 1992. Unfortunately, lack of accountability and an inconsistent foreign policy agenda toward El Salvador led to countless deaths of clergy members. Violence and repression against the clergy foreshadowed the consequences of social justice engagement in El Salvador during the 1970s. A month before his death, Romero proclaimed,

Christ invites us not to fear persecution because, believe me, brothers and sisters, those who are committed to the poor must risk the same fate as the poor, and in El Salvador we know what the fate of the poor signifies: to disappear, to be tortured, to be captive, and to be found dead.\footnote{Judith Noone, \textit{The Same Fate as the Poor} (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1995), epigraph.}

Unfortunately, this was the case for him and thousands of other activists who sought to bring social change to El Salvador. The case covered demonstrates how the U.S. ignored its professed commitment to human rights and democracy during the Cold War. Economic interests and the perceived threat of the USSR drove U.S. policies. The United States saw communism present in men and women who had dedicated their lives to helping the poor, even though they perceived themselves as following Jesus’ gospel. Fortunately, their voices have not been silenced; millions today still remember and read their writings. They continue to be an inspiration with their words of justice. As a Maryknoll sister when lamenting the death of fellow nuns stated,

The United States has to realize it does not own Central America or any other part of the world…people have the right to shape their own destiny, to choose the type of government they want. We don’t lose Cuba, we don’t lose Nicaragua because they were never ours to lose. The sooner we accept this, the better.\footnote{Brett Wilkins, “On This Day 1980: American Nuns Kidnapped, Raped and Murdered by U.S.-Trained Salvadoran Death Squad,” December 2, 2010, \url{http://morallowground.com/2010/12/02/on-this-day-1980-american-nuns-kidnapped-raped-murdered-by-american-trained-salvadoran-death-squad/}.}
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The Long Civil Rights Movement in St. Augustine, Florida:
Reverend Thomas A. Wright and Florida Memorial College, 1954-1963

Michael Lee Henley

*Flagler College*
Despite its significance, St. Augustine is frequently left out of the long list of local movements that played a role in the civil rights movement. When remembered, St. Augustine is often commemorated for its contribution to the national movement when Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) campaigned in the city during the summer of 1964. However, the St. Augustine Movement experienced three different phases in conjunction with the national movement before 1963. Following the Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Board (1954), St. Augustine was led by the Reverend Thomas A. Wright, president of the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). In the context of Brown, Wright initiated a top-down approach by appealing to the local government in order to win civil rights victories. The St. Augustine Movement shifted again in light of the Greensboro Four in 1960 as Wright trained students from Florida Memorial College in nonviolent direct action to stage sit-ins at the local Woolworth’s. After Wright was forced to leave in 1962, Dr. Robert Hayling became the primary local leader and adopted a more militant approach in the aftermath of the Birmingham Movement and the assassination of Medgar Evers in 1963. These shifts demonstrate the complexity of the local movement in St. Augustine before King and SCLC arrived to campaign for the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In her landmark article “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Jacquelyn Dowd Hall demonstrates that the memory and images of Dr. King and the civil rights movement have been “frozen in 1963” during the iconic, “I Have A Dream Speech.” For this reason, the St. Augustine Movement during the summer of 1964 is often forgotten in the scope of the entirety of the Civil Rights Era. Hall encourages historians to revise their methodological approach away from the “classical phase of the struggle,” which she terms the “short civil rights movement.” She urges historians instead to go beyond the narratives of Brown
v. Board, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by examining the World War II era as well as the 1970s. Yet, the problem with emphasizing an expanded timeframe in this way is that historians have yet to fully understand local movements during the aforementioned classical phase. The events of the St. Augustine Movement within the context of the “Brown-to-Memphis timeline” serve as examples of the complexities of the local movement that have not been studied by historians. Reexamining these events provides a better foundation for historians to broaden their perspectives and create a more complete history of the era overall.

Even within the scope of the “short civil rights movement,” the first two phases of the St. Augustine Movement have been almost completely omitted from the scholarly literature. Historians such as David Colburn generally focus on the presence of King and the SCLC in St. Augustine. In addition to emphasizing the SCLC campaign, historians, primarily Colburn, suggest that the movement started in 1963 under the leadership of Hayling. Consequently, numerous influential individuals, including Wright and the students at Florida Memorial College, are missing from the rich and complex history of St. Augustine’s evolving local movement. By understanding and acknowledging the first two phases in the movement, the “short civil rights movement” becomes longer and more complex, and significant events apart from the presence of King and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are revealed.

To be sure, Reverend Thomas A. Wright became the father of the St. Augustine Movement in its earliest incarnation in the wake of the Brown decision. As president of the local NAACP chapter, Wright adopted methods of activism that reflected the evolving national civil

127 Hall, 1,234.
rights movement. Likewise, the role of St. Augustine students’ involvement changed under Wright’s leadership following the Greensboro Four’s sit-in, placing St. Augustine within the grander narrative of civil rights as it existed in 1960. However, Hayling’s ascension as the local movement’s primary leader in 1962 signifies the end of the era. In 1964, both Hayling and the SCLC left the city, depriving the movement of its leaders and causing it to fade from the greater civil rights story.

In contrast to the way in which Florida is remembered during the civil rights era, Irvin Winsboro writes that “white Floridians fought as hard as their Dixie neighbors” in order to preserve their way of life. Concerning Florida’s history of race relations and supposed regional exceptionalism, Winsboro writes, “Although Florida often escaped the ugly national images of die-hard segregationists . . . the list of violent acts against civil rights activists in Florida is pervasive.” Furthermore, Florida led the nation in the rate of per capita lynchings at certain points in the early twentieth century, proving to be “twice that of Mississippi, three times that of Alabama, and six times that of South Carolina for comparable time periods.” Though it is true that Florida was not as explicitly radical as other states in the 1950s and 1960s, Winsboro asserts that white supremacy in Florida “reappeared in measured policies of state government” as the civil rights movement emerged.

Following the *Brown* decision in 1954, Florida officials ignored and defied the Supreme Court’s decision to integrate schools. Though Florida failed to comply with the *Brown* decision, officials were still able to uphold the image of being progressive. Marvin Dunn notes, “At best, the Sunshine State projected a contrived image of moderation, and at worst, Florida simply

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129 Ibid., 6.
130 Ibid., 7.
continued its color line under the guise of New South progress.”  

Dunn points out that the Governor at the time, Leroy Collins, “vowed to use the powers of his office to maintain racial separation in the Sunshine State,” and he concludes that the post-Brown period was the start of “heightened activism and danger.”

As both violence and activism increased, Florida fought hard to maintain the image of being racially moderate by committing itself to what William H. Chafe describes as “civility.” Chafe defines civility as “the cornerstone of the progressive mystique, signifying courtesy, concern about an associate’s family, children, and health, a personal grace that smoothes contact with strangers and obscures conflict with foes.” In the perspective of civil rights, Chafe defines it further as “a way of dealing with people and problems that made good manners more important than substantial action.”

Though Chafe is referencing the commitment to civility in North Carolina, his comments can just as easily be used to describe the way that Florida dealt with the increased momentum of civil rights. In the post-Brown era, it was more important for Governor Collins to keep Florida from gaining national attention for its devotion to segregation than to initiate attempts to integrate schools and comply with the demands made by civil rights organizations. As long as Collins upheld the image of moderation and denied its deeply rooted prejudices, then Florida would not be forced by the federal government to obey the mandate to integrate schools.

In St. Augustine, the commitment to civility was especially important due to its tourism-based economy. Concerning the connection between race relations and tourism in St. Augustine

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132 Ibid., 24, 31.
at the turn of the century, Colburn writes, “Indeed, in order to insure the continuation of a profitable tourist economy, whites and blacks became dependent on one another.” However, living conditions for African Americans changed drastically during the post-war era. African Americans in St. Augustine never fully recovered from the depression, and many had already left after the First World War. By the 1950s, “Little progress occurred for black residents . . . These limitations meant that both husbands and wives had to work if the family was to enjoy more than a poverty-stricken existence.” Despite the fact that St. Augustine had a local NAACP chapter, Colburn argues that Brown v. Board “virtually had no immediate impact on race relations in St. Augustine.” Colburn simply negates Wrights’ progress with the local chapter because he “proposed no radical change in racial practices.” Conversely, research concerning Wright’s involvement demands reconsideration in order to understand how the St. Augustine Movement developed from the wake of Brown to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The importance of Brown v. Board goes behind the issue of segregated schools. The Brown decision overturned Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which was the basis for the legality of Jim Crow laws. Just as Plessy was originally connected to the segregation of street cars and was applied to all public facilities, civil rights activists and organizations saw Brown as an opportunity to eliminate segregation in its multiple incarnations. The success of Brown demonstrated to African Americans that social equality could potentially be a reality in their lifetimes. Furthermore, because Brown v. Board was an NAACP case, it validated the role of local chapters across the nation. The spirit of Brown enthused and encouraged local leaders to appeal to the courts in order to win civil rights victories. When Wright moved to St. Augustine in

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135 Ibid., 23.
136 Ibid., 25-27.
137 Ibid., 27.
the wake of Brown, he came with the hope of making the nation’s oldest city the model for racial progress.

Like many inspirational figures from the era, Wright was a student of the famous Howard University divinity school. His training instilled in him the ability to lead a community outside of just the regular Sunday morning meetings. Rather than focusing on what Wright refers to as “theological conservatism,” he focused on how the church could influence and empower the people in the congregation to change the world they were living in. Following his graduation from Howard, the first church to which he was assigned as a minister was St. Mary’s Baptist Church in St. Augustine’s historically black district. In addition to becoming the head pastor, he also received a part-time job teaching at Florida Memorial College where he had been a student after he served in the military during World War II. Like many of the leaders of the era, his exposure to the world outside of the South, along with his clerical training, left Wright feeling obligated to take part in the movement that had been developing.

Even prior to the Montgomery Bus Boycott (1955), Wright was determined to encourage the people of St. Augustine “to believe the spirit and attitude of justice.” During his time in St. Augustine, Wright said many times, “since it is said to be the oldest city . . . it ought to be held as the model for the nation” for racial equality. Wright’s determination sparked the earliest manifestation of a formal movement in St. Augustine, but like the national movement, it took some time before it could gain momentum. Many African Americans were apathetic toward the civil rights movement. As far as the older generations were concerned, schools were not being

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139 Ibid., 12.
integrated, police brutality was not coming to a halt, and tragedies such as the murder of Emmett Till were still fresh in their minds. Consequently, these older generations were less likely to join the progressive civil rights movement.

Despite the lack of support from the majority of the community and from other important leaders, Wright continued to preach about St. Augustine’s potential to lead the nation in civil rights. Wright decided that if he could not immediately get the entire community on board, then he could at least make St. Mary’s Baptist Church the local model for seeking justice in light of *Brown*. Because there was so much hesitation from older members of the community, Wright specifically placed a great deal of emphasis on the involvement of the youth within the church. One student who became increasingly involved with the church and the pursuit of civil rights was Henry “Hank” Thomas. After Thomas finished high school, Wright helped him raise enough money to attend a national youth rally at Howard University. After attending the rally at Howard, Thomas dedicated his life to the cause and eventually became one of the original Freedom Riders in the summer of 1961. Stories such as that of Hank Thomas demonstrate further that Wright planted seeds in the St. Augustine Movement that reached the national movement years before Hayling or King became involved on the local level.

In his autobiography, Wright explains how it was too dangerous to be associated with the NAACP in St. Augustine during the 1950s and in early 1960. Wright’s insight demonstrates that the threat of violence in St. Augustine was present years before Dr. Hayling even arrived and became active in civil rights. Wright explains that there was an active chapter over which he was the president, but that the local NAACP had to be referred to as the “Saint Augustine Improvement Association,” a name that mirrors the Montgomery Improvement Association.

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141 Ibid., 104.
142 Ibid., 108.
where King started his career has an activist.\textsuperscript{143} Under a different guise, the small group of activists in St. Augustine was able to create a movement by focusing on lesser concerns in order to work their way up to challenging larger issues. Wright’s first target was the department of public recreation.

Wright noticed early on that public facilities were not just segregated and far from equal. As Wright investigated the issue of funding for public recreation further, he found that the city spent $35,000 a year on recreational facilities and employees for whites. In comparison, only $500 was being spent for African American recreation.\textsuperscript{144} Furthermore, the $500 dedicated to African American spending went directly to two high school coaches.\textsuperscript{145} When Wright met with those at the African American Recreation Committee to begin to make resolutions, he was told that he “did not understand exactly what was going on,” and he was labeled as crazy for suggesting that they demand $5,000 for the upcoming year.\textsuperscript{146} Wright took his complaints to two white city commissioners who agreed to meet with him. He argued that they should not only allot $5,000 per year on African American public recreation facilities, but also hire a part-time director of recreation dedicated specifically to African American public facilities and pay the director $3,600 of the new budget.\textsuperscript{147} Ironically, the commissioners approved and affirmed his demands, and the program became fairly successful given the limited budget.

Next, Wright focused on the public library. The public library had a reading room strictly for African Americans that was overseen by Dorcas Saunders. The library received no formal funding, but operated on donations only. Wright pushed for the city to have an annual donation

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{145} L.O. Davis, the notorious Sheriff in St. Johns County who was affiliated with the local Klan in 1963 and 1964, was also a football coach for the all-black team at Excelsior High School, located in the historically black neighborhood where Davis was also a resident. There is not enough evidence to claim that he was one of the recipients of the $500; however, it does beg the question for future researchers.
\textsuperscript{146} Wright, \textit{Courage in Persona}, 109.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
for the reading room in order to increase funds and encourage people in the community to take
interest in the facility.\textsuperscript{148} Issues such as the library demonstrate what Colburn argued concerning
a lack of radical attempts for change while Wright was the primary leader. However, after small
victories in securing public accommodations, Wright gained the confidence to move onto the
issue of violence against African Americans from the local police.

Even though Florida managed to isolate itself from the violent Deep South states in the
eyes of the nation, Wright recognized that “police harassment and brutality were real civil rights
issues in St. Augustine.”\textsuperscript{149} One scarring example that Wright recalled is that of an African
American woman, between the ages of twenty-five and thirty, who was arrested for being under
the influence of alcohol and then brutally beaten by police officers until blood completely
covered her clothes.\textsuperscript{150} The community responded by hiring an attorney out of Jacksonville
named Earl Johnson to cover the case. The church and community raised the money in order to
pay for the necessary fees and charges for hiring the attorney. Regardless of the fact that the
young woman showed up to her trial wearing her bloody clothes, the attorney told them that they
“did not have much of a case.”\textsuperscript{151} The attorney’s response proved to Wright that the St.
Augustine authorities did not have a problem meeting his demands of improving segregated
facilities, but when it came to accusing whites, Wright found himself in a battle that he could not
win during his time in the nation’s oldest city.

Inspired by the Montgomery Bus Boycott and a similar movement in Tallahassee at the
end of the 1950s, Wright began to make white businesses the focal target for the movement that
had received both success and disappointment. During the 1950s and 1960s, Wright writes,

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid, 110.
“Scrubbing floors and keeping the buildings clean was the only kind of job for African Americans on St. George Street and on other sections of the business community.” As the local movement appeared to gain momentum, Wright and others made their demands for African Americans to be given the opportunity to work at higher paying, responsible positions at the stores that they often patronized. When the local businessmen failed to respond to their requests, the activists began to highlight the injustice by distributing handbills throughout the business district. Afterward, they began to boycott local businesses. Surprisingly, they received large support from the community.

The justification used to get the rest of the community on board was to emphasize the irony that the local businesses would gladly accept African American customers but would refuse to allow them to work there based on their race. The apex of the selective shopping demonstrations occurred during the Christmas shopping season. Wright writes, “We asked African American citizens to go to Jacksonville and to Palatka to do their Christmas shopping. We asked them to organize motor pools and travel together.” The boycotts did not result in a civil rights victory because the activists’ demands were not met by the merchants; however, it was a success for the local movement because it demonstrated that the community was ready to participate in nonviolent protests in order to be treated as first-class citizens. The boycott campaign demonstrates that there was an active, organized, and eager community of African Americans who were fighting for equality prior to the advent of the traditional St. Augustine civil rights narrative.

The success of mobilizing people for a movement was followed by resistance from the white community. The boycott hurt the local economy and proved to the white community that

152 Ibid., 111.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
African Americans were not happy in their alleged place. Once resistant whites found out that Wright was responsible for the organized protests, he and his family were targeted. After only a few months following the selective buying boycotts, Wright’s wife relocated to Boynton, Florida, with their children because she believed that it had become too dangerous for their family in St. Augustine. As death threats increased, Wright began to wonder how he could continue to be active in civil rights and keep his family safe at the same time.\textsuperscript{155} The national movement, on the other hand, had reached the eve of its student phase, which entailed college students throughout the South participating in sit-ins at local lunch counters in order to fight Jim Crow. Wright’s plan to lay low had to be put on hold.

By 1960, college-aged students throughout the South had lived through the failed promises of \textit{Brown}, had been inspired by the grassroots approach of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, and had felt empowered by the images of Elizabeth Eckford and the Little Rock Nine integrating Central High School in 1957. College freshmen in 1960 had gone through elementary, middle, and high school with these memories of African Americans demanding change. When these students became freshmen at historically black colleges dispersed throughout the region, they became both impatient with attempts to eliminate Jim Crow and eager to attack segregation directly. Nonviolent direct action protests, such as sit-ins, became the outlet through which they could best fight for their rights to be treated as first-class citizens. Howard Zinn writes, “Impatience with the courts, with the national and local governments, with negotiation and conciliation, with the traditional Negro organizations and the old Negro leadership,” encapsulated the mood of the movement.\textsuperscript{156} Nonviolent demonstrations by the Greensboro Four launched a student-led movement throughout the South that no one was ready

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 112.
for—except for the students who had been longing to fight for their freedom. To no surprise, students had become impatient with the courts, federal government, and local government; however, student activism also meant rebelling against the traditions of older African American leaders and organizations.

The institution that students were perhaps most frustrated with may have been the very schools they attended. Historically black colleges, for the most part, had their roots in the Reconstruction era or the 1890s following the example of Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee Institute. Jeffery A. Turner explains that schools following the Tuskegee model generally “stressed the need for cooperation with white southerners and deemphasized political participation.” Furthermore, Washington believed in providing African Americans with vocational-based educational opportunities over “mere book learning.”\textsuperscript{157} Though Washington’s model was well suited for his context, in the context of the evolving civil rights movement, Washington’s philosophies were considered outdated by the students who attended the very schools that held onto the gradualist and passive perspectives. At the same time, the faculty members at such institutions were not willing to reject the long tradition of refraining from demanding equal opportunities as set forth from one of the most important figures in African American history.

The dilemma during the sit-in movement, particularly in the Deep South, was that black colleges often had “an all-white state governing board, a black president forced to answer to that board, and a critical mass of protesting students.”\textsuperscript{158} Consequently, Florida Memorial, like other private schools, had “cautious administrations” when dealing with student activism.\textsuperscript{159} Despite

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 66.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 33.
the leadership of the faculties, the limitations could not prevent college students in the South from sitting-in at lunch counters throughout the region. Rebeka Kowal writes that the image of the Greensboro Four “embodied a redirection of energy writ large away from dependence on surrogates like lawyers, judges, and scholars who pursued equal rights through legislative and judicial means and toward self-reliance.”\textsuperscript{160} The appearance of the Four attacking Jim Crow by sitting-in inspired college-aged students, compelling them to take matters into their own hands. Aldon Morris’ study on the sit-in movement demonstrates that over four hundred demonstrations took place after February 1, 1960, when the Four sat-in at the Woolworth’s lunch counter in Greensboro. Though North Carolina led the country with greatest number of sit-ins for that year, Florida reached the second most demonstrations—St. Augustine being one of the cities that participated.\textsuperscript{161} St. Augustine’s inclusion in the sit-in movement further demonstrates that a movement had been in the making before the time that historians have traditionally believed.

After the St. Augustine Movement had experienced a stalemate due to the threats against the local leaders, college students at Florida Memorial displayed a newfound interest in civil rights demonstrations inspired by the Greensboro Four and the student movement. Coincidentally, Wright had been teaching at Florida Memorial part-time and had been feeling anxious to pick up where the movement had left off. By March of 1960, the same students Wright had in his classes at the college had become his students in nonviolent workshops. Furthermore, it was the students themselves who had approached Wright and urged him to get involved in civil rights again. Immediately, meetings concerning how the sit-ins were to be conducted were held in the reading room at the public library.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{162} Wright, \textit{Courage in Persona}, 113.
Because of the spontaneous nature of the sit-ins, training for nonviolent direct action did not have a specific model through which it could be taught. In places like Nashville, students of theology who had studied Gandhi had more formal training in the philosophy and application of nonviolence, but the example of the Greensboro Four seemed easy enough to follow for the Florida Memorial students. Wright and the students’ discussions stressed the importance of remaining calm, not responding to name calling, not striking back in the event of being attacked, refraining from the use of profanities, and bringing reading material in case they would be protesting for a long period of time.\(^{163}\)

The first sit-in was held at the Woolworth’s lunch counter in downtown St. Augustine on Tuesday, March 15, 1960. Six students marched from West Augustine to the lunch counter and conducted a sit-in without a disturbance. For a city that eventually had a large civil rights campaign, it is curious why only a small group of six people gathered for the city’s first wave of nonviolent demonstrations. The lack of a large group of protesting students suggests that members of St. Augustine’s African American community were too afraid to participate for one of two reasons. First, students feared the threat of police brutality that African Americans received when stepping out of their alleged place. Additionally, students feared being confronted by Florida Memorial’s president Royal Puryear, who threatened to suspend students who participated in demonstrations.\(^{164}\)

Puryear had come to Florida Memorial in 1950 and had spent his career attempting to bring the school back to its liberal arts roots and away from vocational programs; however, the school placed a special emphasis on its education program.\(^{165}\) School politics became a difficult

\(^{163}\) Ibid., 113.

\(^{164}\) Colburn, 69.

matter for Puryear in 1958 when he realized that the community was not large enough to gather the financial support required to maintain the school’s prestigious aspirations. The lack of financial support from the community prior to the students’ protesting led the board to discuss the possibility of relocating the college as early as 1958. In his memoir, Dan Warren writes about Puryear’s struggle to maintain the support of the whites: “In an effort to maintain his relationship with city leaders, he initially forbade students from participating.” Puryear was fully aware that he had been regarded as an Uncle Tom by the community, but he felt he had to appeal to white elites in order to save the college from having to relocate.

Florida Memorial students protested a second time the following day at the same lunch counter where they sat until the store closed. The white community was not prepared for African American students to demonstrate for civil rights. It is likely that segregationists did not even take the first and second demonstrations seriously. Colburn writes, “Whites remained convinced that blacks in St. Augustine were quite content with racial traditions.” In the summer of 1960, Hank Thomas sat-in at the local McCory’s lunch counter, was arrested, and was then sent to the hospital that night by whites who were “seeking to have him ruled insane and committed to a mental institution.” Whites had convinced themselves that St. Augustine, along with the rest of the state, was racially moderate and progressive; therefore, they could not understand why their black community would want to protest.

The third and final sit-in, however, was unlike anything that anyone in St. Augustine had ever seen. The demonstration held by eight Florida Memorial students on Thursday, March 17,
1960, was so violent that it received national attention. A *New York Times* column covered the event, reporting that a group of white men attacked the eight students for “barely a minute” after the students left Woolworth’s. In addition, the column claimed that the police called a cab for the students in order to assure that they would arrive home safely. The author wrote, “As the Negroes left the building, white men attacked them with their fists. The Negroes fled to the cab about 100 feet away with the white persons pursuing them.” Furthermore, the column explained that the Chief of Police was present and armed with tear gas in the event that the crowd got out of hand; however, the crowd fled shortly after the students were escorted away from the scene.¹⁷¹

Wright recalled the event in a slightly different way than the *New York Times* portrayed it. First, Wright remembers that a cabdriver had been downtown and reported to Wright while he was at his home. He remained at home because it was to be a student-led demonstration and because he did not want to endanger his own family. The cabdriver arrived at Wright’s home and told him that “about 500 people are gathered outside the drugstore. They are ready to kill those children. They have axe handles, sticks, and maybe some guns.” Though the physical violence may have lasted only for a minute, it went on long enough for one of the students to be “beaten unmercifully” and to have his ribs cracked. The cabdriver had to take the student all the way to Palatka in order to receive treatment from an African American physician.¹⁷²

White resistance continued following the demonstration, even though the sit-ins were put to an end due to the mass violence from the mob of segregationists. Angry whites began to target the dorms at Florida Memorial by driving around the campus in order to intimidate the students, throwing rocks, and yelling profanities. The students did not know what to expect from the whites, who they suspected were members of the local Klu Klux Klan. They never knew if they

would encounter Molotov cocktails, burning crosses, or perhaps even bombs going off at the dorms, which had been the case in multiple Southern cities during the era. Despite the fact that it was a Baptist college, Florida Memorial students were not afraid to take up arms in order to protect themselves. Students were so scared that that they went to class armed and climbed trees outside of the dorms in order to keep an eye out for suspected Klansmen.¹⁷³

Puryear described the students at Florida Memorial as gravitating toward the “Muslim Movement” as conditions worsened concerning race relations. He claimed that the alleged Muslim Movement had taken over St. Augustine; however, Puryear preferred to call it the “Mooselim Movement” because they were a particularly “violent group.” He explained that there was a female student who was the “leader of the cult” and who opposed the application of nonviolence during the most brutal phase of the movement.¹⁷⁴ Puryear was not claiming that students had converted from Christianity to Islam; rather, he was observing that students had become disenchanted with nonviolence and appeared to mimic Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam rather than King and the SCLC. The mass resistance on behalf of the African American community soon began to characterize the movement up until the SCLC began their campaign in the city in 1964. In fact, when the SCLC arrived in the city, leaders had to convince those willing to demonstrate not to carry weapons during the night marches.¹⁷⁵

Wright was not in St. Augustine when Dr. King arrived because he was forced to leave the city by 1962. Once African Americans had demonstrated that they wanted to be treated as first-class citizens in St. Augustine, segregationists became more vocal, militant, and present in the Ancient City. As the number of resistant whites grew, the number of activists decreased

¹⁷⁵ Crossing in St. Augustine, directed by CB Hackworth (2010; Atlanta, GA: Andrew Young Presents, 2012), DVD.
following the sit-ins of March 1960. Also, it did not take whites long to figure out that Wright had been responsible for mobilizing the college students. Subsequently, Wright became the initial target for intimidation.

In the weeks leading to Wright’s departure, a Lincolnville resident and friend visited Wright at his home, exclaiming, “Get out of town right now! I heard them talking at the water department where I work. They were saying the best for us to do is kill that nigger as soon as we can.” Moreover, due to her husband’s involvement in civil rights, Wright’s wife was fired from her teaching job and had to be hired as a part-time secretary at St. Mary’s. However, deacons at St. Mary’s had signed a petition to force Wright to resign because of his involvement in the movement, which had now appeared to abandon conservative values within the community more than ever. Furthermore, the potential for violence was constantly on Wright’s mind. Indeed, Wright’s wife had heard from a neighbor who worked at a restaurant that the business’ white clientele had discussed “how to get that Negro out of town.” Finally, in August 1962, Wright and his family relocated to Gainesville, making way for the third phase of the local struggle for equality.

Dr. Hayling moved to St. Augustine in 1960 and became the first black dentist in St. Augustine. Ironically, he also treated white patients—some of whom were affiliated with the local Klan. Despite his early arrival, Hayling did not get involved in the local movement until 1963 after Wright moved. Hayling became the NAACP Youth Council advisor and was accused of using militant rhetoric, which attracted the college and high school students who were eager for a more aggressive, yet nonviolent approach. Like Wright, however, Hayling did not make radical demands. As the four hundredth celebration of St. Augustine’s founding approached, the

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177 Ibid., 117.
city received federal funding to stage the event. Hayling simply demanded that a biracial committee be formed for organizing the event.\textsuperscript{178}

When Hayling became involved in civil rights, the movement had reached a third watershed year. Just as Wright got involved following \textit{Brown}, and Florida Memorial students got involved during the sit-in movement, Hayling became involved after a multitude of events that transpired in 1963. By the summer and early fall of 1963, the SCLC’s Birmingham campaign had gained success, and the images of children being blown off the sidewalk by water hoses had shocked the nation. On August 28 of that year, King gave his famous “I Have A Dream Speech” at the March On Washington rally. On the other hand, four girls at the 16\textsuperscript{th} Street Baptist Church in Birmingham were killed after a bomb went off only a few weeks after the demonstration. Furthermore, the NAACP president for the Mississippi state branch, Medgar Evers, was assassinated in his driveway in front of his family. In the aftermath of Evers’ death, Hayling was charged with saying, “Unlike Medgar Evers, I am prepared to defend myself.”\textsuperscript{179} This series of events demonstrates that the movement had reached a stalemate, which reflected the African American experience in St. Augustine.

As the primary leader, Hayling constantly protested and picketed, and received major backlash from the white community. The Klan’s presence in St. Augustine increased and became more violent as African Americans under Hayling’s leadership made more demands for being treated as first-class citizens by targeting local businesses. Many of the students who followed Hayling were not dedicated to nonviolence; consequently, they often armed themselves during marches. St. Augustine was unique to the national movement because the city had a formal

\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Crossing in St. Augustine}, directed by CB Hackworth.

As a consequence of Hayling’s high-profile demonstrations, sit-ins, and picketing, he became victim to the St. Augustine Movement’s most violent episodes when he interrupted a Klan meeting, which featured the rhetoric of hate, Klansmen in full regalia, and a burning cross. Once Hayling was spotted in his car while attempting to flee from the site, he was pulled out of his car, beaten, and almost burned alive. The leader of the rally began to cry out how he would oblige those who had never “had the pleasure of smelling a nigger burn,” as he poured gasoline on Hayling and two others who accompanied him. Fortunately for Hayling, one of the Klansmen present was an undercover officer and reported the event to the police in Jacksonville, allowing Hayling and the others to escape with their lives. Ironically, Hayling was falsely charged and found guilty of assault in the aftermath of the incident.\footnote{“Fla. Flogging Victim Guilty,” \textit{Pittsburg Courier}, October 26, 1963, \textit{Civil Rights Library of St. Augustine}, http://flagler.contentdm.oclc.org (accessed March 30, 2013).} Such an event is not only unique to St. Augustine, but is a violent story that is unmatched by any other local movement from the era.

The local event that gathered the most national attention, however, was the case of the St. Augustine Four, which took place just months prior to the Klan rally. Similar to many stories of the era, four high school students conducted a sit-in at the Woolworth’s lunch counter on King Street in downtown St. Augustine for one of the many regularly held demonstrations in the summer of 1963. As a result, Willie Carl Singleton, Samuel White, Audrey Nell Edwards, and JoeAnn Anderson were arrested for refusing to move from their seats at the counter and were sentenced to spend six months in jail and reform school. At the same time, Judge Charles Mathis, a staunch segregationist, offered an ultimatum to the students, asking the parents to claim that
Hayling was the cause for the alleged juvenile delinquency, for which he would be charged as a felon. The children did not allow their parents to take the offer and spent double the time that they were originally sentenced in order for Hayling to preserve the third phase of the movement that had been forged. Furthermore, when the youths were released, baseball legend, Jackie Robinson, invited the teens to his house and became a frequent visitor of St. Augustine during the SCLC’s campaign.\textsuperscript{182}

The violence conducted and inspired by the Klansmen attracted leaders of the SCLC who sought to aid another local movement in order to remind Congress of the importance of federal civil rights legislation. When the SCLC arrived, they began to train all of the activists nonviolently and organize daily demonstrations. Consequently, Hayling became less of an important figure in the community, and the local movement came to an end. Furthermore, once Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the SCLC abandoned St. Augustine and ended their campaign under the assumption that the local movement’s goals would be met by the city, since King was promised that a biracial committee would be formed.\textsuperscript{183} Although King and the SCLC had reason to doubt the city officials, they were eager to leave St. Augustine due to the mass violence. One of King’s most trusted SCLC members, Andrew Young, wrote in his autobiography, “It was time for us to get the hell out of St. Augustine . . . as long as we believed compliance would be forthcoming.”\textsuperscript{184} The absence of King, the SCLC, and television reporters resulted in increased backlashes against activists and African American residents from the Klan and other segregationists who opposed the passage and abiding of the landmark legislation. Because of the threat to his and his family’s safety, Hayling was forced to relocate to south

\textsuperscript{182} Crossing in St. Augustine, directed by CB Hackworth.
\textsuperscript{183} Colburn, 211.
\textsuperscript{184} Andrew Young, An Easy Burden: The Civil Rights Movement and the Transformation of America (Baylor, TX: Baylor University Press, 2008), 296.
Florida around the same time that King and the SCLC left, thus leaving St. Augustine without an influential leader.\textsuperscript{185}

Hayling’s role as a leader in 1963 marks the final phase for the St. Augustine Movement. Hayling was the second primary leader to assume a leadership position before King and the SCLC came to campaign in St. Augustine for the sake of the national movement. Though Colburn acknowledges that King and the SCLC neglected the local movement by disregarding the local goal of forming a biracial committee, he also claims that King and SCLC “failed to develop or encourage a grass roots movement.”\textsuperscript{186} Colburn’s conclusion ignores the fact that a grassroots, local movement had been taking place ten years prior to the presence of King and even Hayling. Though Hayling’s involvement was certainly the apex of the movement, it was not the genesis. Indeed, the departure of Hayling and the withdrawal of King and the SCLC from St. Augustine ended the local movement because of the lack of leadership. In order to understand the St. Augustine Movement, the entire scope of its existence must be examined through its multiple phases. In doing so, the local struggle is better understood and ultimately demonstrates the complexity of the civil rights movement as a whole.

\textsuperscript{185} Crossing in St. Augustine, directed by CB Hackworth.
\textsuperscript{186} Colburn, 210.
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Timeless Natives, Enchanted Lands: Tourists in the American Southwest and the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935

Hannah Greenwald

Amherst College
In 1923, social reformer John Collier wrote a letter to the editor of the *New York Times* about the importance of Native American tribal dances and religious rituals. Native American religion, Collier wrote, “includes so much that ascetic Christianity has cast out from religion and committed to the world and the devil.” He argued that white outsiders were mistaken in thinking of Native Americans as simple-minded barbarians; in fact, the white man could learn a lot from studying the Native American way of life. Collier ended his letter by imploring Americans to recognize “the sacredness of the primitive religion to the primitive, and the beauty and nobility of it to the eyes of the informed civilized man.”\(^{187}\) Collier’s comments reflect Americans’ changing perceptions of Native Americans; by the 1920s, many Anglo Americans had stopped seeing Natives as savage and threatening, as they did in the late nineteenth century, and instead had become fascinated with "primitive" Native American cultures.\(^{188}\)

In 1933, Collier became the Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. As commissioner, one of his most notable achievements was the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which gave Native American tribes the right to return to local self-governance and formally ended the U.S. government’s centuries-long attempt to assimilate Natives into mainstream Anglo society.\(^{189}\) One year later, Collier was involved in the passage of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA) of 1935. This act called for the creation of the Indian Arts and Crafts Board, whose job it was to regulate and expand the growing market for Native American-produced crafts and goods. One of the board’s primary responsibilities was to create trademarks for genuine Indian products, and to punish anyone who falsely represented a product

as “Indian-made.” The stated purpose of the law was to allow Native Americans to uphold their artisanal traditions while also bettering their situation through participation in the market economy. However, the act carried some troubling implications. Much like Collier’s letter to the editor, the Indian Arts and Crafts Act celebrated Native American culture but also simplified it. The act relegated Native Americans inescapably to the past and empowered the U.S. government to decide what was “traditional” or “authentic” to a certain Native American tribe.

The passage of the IACA represented a new desire among Anglo Americans to preserve and celebrate the Native American cultures that only a few decades ago the government had tried to eradicate. To understand this profound shift in the way that Anglos imagined Native Americans, one must first understand the socio-cultural factors that led to the passage of the IACA in 1935. Increased railroad infrastructure and the growth of the Native American tourism industry in the Southwest in the 1920s and 1930s brought many Anglo-American tourists into ‘Indian Country.’ These visitors romanticized the seemingly simple, primitive lifestyle of Native Americans and began to see them as artifacts or attractions, rather than full participants in modern society. Additionally, trends of anti-modernism and primitivism in the early twentieth century led many Americans to exalt the Native American as a noble figure untouched by the ills of modernity. All of these social factors compelled people like John Collier to fight for legislation like the IACA as a way to protect the supposed “purity” of the Native American way of life from encroaching modern forces.

Several authors have written on the Native American policy changes in the 1930s, and other authors have written about changing perceptions of Native Americans in the early twentieth century. Few, however, have sufficiently analyzed the interplay between public

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190 *Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935*, S.2203, 74th Cong.
opinion and government policy. For example, in *More than Curiosities: A Grassroots History of the Indian Arts and Crafts Board and its Precursors, 1920-1942*, Susan Meyn discusses Southwestern Native American tourism and its effect on the formation of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935. Meyn argues that increased tourism to the Southwest in the 1920s and a growing interest in “authentic” Indian handicrafts led to the commoditization of Native American culture for tourist consumption, which continued until the government decided to regulate the market in the 1930s.\(^{192}\) Meyn’s analysis of the IACA, however, falls short in one crucial way. She argues that the act sought to protect Native Americans from unscrupulous competitors, but she does not analyze in depth the socio-cultural factors that made Anglo-American legislators *want* to help Native Americans advance economically while preserving their culture. After centuries of forced migrations, mandatory boarding schools, racism, and assimilation policies, the desire among Anglos to preserve and cultivate traditional Native cultures represents a noteworthy shift in public attitude towards Native Americans.

Several factors contributed to this shift, as other authors have noted. In the 1880s, railroad travel opened up the Southwest to tourists, ethnographers, writers, and artists in the American middle class.\(^{193}\) Shelby J. Tisdale argues that the subsequent boom in tourism in the Southwest and the resulting contact between Natives and middle-class Anglos made entering the market economy an attractive option for Natives. Many abandoned their previous economic pursuits, such as producing utilitarian or domestic objects like pots and baskets, and became full-time artisans, producing handicrafts for tourist consumption.\(^{194}\) Cindra Kline’s *Navajo Spoons: Indian Artistry and the Souvenir Trade, 1880s-1940s* echoes this argument. Kline examines the


\(^{193}\) McLerran, 20.

effect of the tourism industry on the production of the Navajo spoon. She finds that over time, the spoons were mass-produced and began to incorporate symbols and designs that were marketable but not necessarily culturally meaningful, such as the Thunderbird.\(^{195}\) These sources help to explain the ways that tourism impacted Native-Anglo social interactions in the land of the Southwest.

Another important factor in the shifting desires of Anglo Americans was the new role of Native Americans in the Anglo imagination. Several authors have studied the way that the Southwest was marketed to tourists as a land of “enchantment” and as an escape from the modern world. Leah Dilworth, author of *Imagining Indians in the Southwest: Persistent Visions of a Primitive Past*, analyzes primitivism in Native American tourism. According to Dilworth, in the early twentieth century, many Anglo tourists glorified the Native American lifestyle because they saw it as simple and uncomplicated by modernity. Tourists wanted to see and experience life as it was in pre-Columbian times.\(^{196}\) As such, businesses like the Fred Harvey Company and the Santa Fe Railroad Company sought to portray the American Southwest as the quintessential representation of America’s idealized past. In “From Desert to Disney World: The Santa Fe Railway and the Fred Harvey Company Display the American Southwest,” Martha Weigle examines the creation of this new regional identity through tourist spectacle and “staged authenticity.”\(^ {197}\) These sources explain what drew Anglo Americans to Indian Country, what

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\(^{195}\) The Thunderbird was a common symbol among Indian tribes in the Great Plains and the Pacific Northwest, but did not appear in Southwestern Indian traditions until 1909. According to Kline, the Fred Harvey Company appropriated the image as an ‘authentic’ symbol of the Indian Southwest. Tourists and sellers endowed the Thunderbird with a new meaning (“The Sacred Bearer of Happiness Unlimited”) that has no basis in Native American tradition. Cindra Kline, *Navajo Spoons: Indian Artistry and the Souvenir Trade, 1880s-1940s* (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 2001), 66-68.

\(^{196}\) Dilworth, *Imagining Indians in the Southwest*, 79-81.

they saw and felt when they were there, and why they were so keen to protect the purity and authenticity of Native Americans by passing legislation like the IACA.

Finally, authors have written about the Indian Arts and Crafts Act itself. Although several studies have looked at the politicians involved in this legislation, few have adequately analyzed the growing American fascination with Native American cultures that impacted the creation of the Act. Jennifer McLerran’s *A New Deal for Native Art: Indian Arts and Federal Policy, 1933-1945* emphasizes the problematic nature of the Indian legislation of the 1930s and 1940s. She writes that such legislation propagated “a binary construction of traditional and modern” that left no room for Native Americans as modern actors. Additionally, several authors have analyzed the IACA of 1990, which mirrors its predecessor but involves harsher punishments for violations. As such, it contains many of the same problems as the original IACA. Both William Hapiuk’s “Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A Critical Analysis of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990,” and Gail Sheffield’s *The Arbitrary Indian: The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990*, take issue with the IACA of 1990 on a fundamental level: Sheffield calls it “socially flawed” and “a threat to the very interests it seeks to protect,” while Hapiuk claims that it does not sufficiently address the complexity of Indian identity. Both sources deal with the problems inherent in the IACA’s attempts to categorize art as “Indian-made,” and the strict dichotomy it creates between Native American art that is “fake” and art that is “authentic.”

Authors have evidently looked at Indian tourism, Indians within the collective Anglo imagination, and the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935. However, few authors have dealt with all three factors together. Without studying the changes in mainstream public opinion about

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198 McLerran, 2.
Native Americans—and analyzing the factors (like tourism) that incited these changes—any study of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act is incomplete. This wealth of secondary literature, when read alongside many primary sources, will shed light on the changes in Anglo/Native interactions in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the effect of Southwestern Indian tourism on the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the Southwestern Indian tourism industry grew considerably. In addition, the style of tourism changed: while Anglos had previously experienced Native American culture by visiting ruins and museums, in the 1920s they began to visit the homes and villages of the Native Americans themselves. This shift invited tourists to think of the Native Americans themselves as tourist attractions or artifacts, and it led to a widespread fascination with the “primitive” and timeless qualities of Native American cultures. This widespread fascination was a major factor in the growth of the Native American arts and crafts market.

In 1915, the Fred Harvey Company, a railroad and hospitality company based in the American Southwest, held an exhibit of Native American handicrafts and artifacts in San Diego called the Painted Desert Exposition. A brochure advertising the exhibit said, “Realizing that many people have neither the time nor the means to visit the Indian tribes which inhabit the country…it was decided to reproduce at the Panama-California Exposition at San Diego, in their Painted Desert Exhibit, typical Indian settlements of the sedentary and nomadic tribes of the Great Southwest.” Before the 1920s, most Native American tourism followed this model; as the brochure stated, many people were unable or unwilling to visit Native American tribes themselves. As such, tourism companies often brought Natives into Anglo spheres, to be observed as oddities or curiosities. The World’s Fairs in Chicago in 1893 and in St. Louis in

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1904 both featured Native American exhibits that gave Anglos the chance to step into the world of Native American culture by visiting a replica of a “traditional native” home. In the Southwest, Indian destinations included museums and hotels such as the Pullman “Pleasure Domes,” upscale resorts whose architecture and design were meant to evoke Native American culture. In the early twentieth century, the Fred Harvey Company built Harvey Houses in several locations throughout the Southwest. The Houses were generally part hotel, part restaurant, and part museum, and they appealed to travelers on transcontinental railroad journeys. The Harvey Houses usually featured Native Americans standing outside in traditional garb, displaying and selling their handicrafts to visitors. Visitors could also spend time at a museum where they could learn about the crafts and the cultures of the Native Americans.

Everything changed in 1926 when the Fred Harvey Company began its Indian Detour program. Introduced by the *Los Angeles Times* as “one of the most interesting and unique vacation trips in America,” the Indian Detour program was meant for passengers on transcontinental railroad journeys who wanted to spend a few extra days exploring the “Indian Country” of the Southwest. Indian Detour travelers embarked on Harveycars with a courier, who was usually a well-educated young woman with special training in hospitality and Native American history. The Detours brought travelers to Native American villages, ruins, and scenic areas. Tourists in 1915 and earlier may not have had the “time nor the means” to visit Indian villages directly; but by 1926, the Fred Harvey Company had given tourists an easy opportunity to experience Indian culture ‘off the beaten track’ of the railroads in comfort and style.

201 Howard, 23, 57.
202 Weigle, 120.
205 Ibid.; Howard, 124-125.
The Indian Detour represented an important and profound shift in Native American tourism. In his 1976 book, *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class*, Dean MacCannell looks at the idea of “staged authenticity” in tourism. He builds upon the ideas of sociologist Erving Goffman, who distinguishes between “front regions,” where hosts meet and entertain guests, and “back regions, where hosts go when they are not entertaining visitors.”

MacCannell nuances the front-back dichotomy by arranging tourist settings into a “continuum starting from the front and ending at the back,” which consists of six stages of increasing authenticity. The six stages are: stage one, Goffman’s front region, which tourists attempt to get ‘behind’; stage two, a front region decorated to look like a back region; stage three, a front region that fully simulates the experience of a back region; stage four, a back region opened up to outsiders; stage five, a back region that “may be cleaned up or altered a bit because tourists are permitted an occasional glimpse in”; and stage six, Goffman’s back region.

Using MacCannell’s terminology, Harvey Hotels and World’s Fair exhibitions represented “stage two” authenticity. The Indian Detours, however, represented a shift into “stage four” authenticity because the Detours allowed Anglo visitors to step directly into the backyards of Native Americans. This invasion of Anglos into the Native sphere had profound repercussions for the Native American tourism industry and for Native American daily life. Previously isolated Natives had to learn to deal with the visitors who suddenly flocked to their homes en masse. Native American villages became tourist attractions, and visitors often forgot—or chose to ignore—the fact that the villages were not amusement parks but rather Native Americans’ homes. As early twentieth century English novelist D.H. Lawrence remarked, “The Southwest is the great playground of the white American. The desert isn’t good for anything else... And the

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207 MacCannell, 101-102.
208 Weigle, 126.
Indian, with his long hair and bits of pottery and blankets and clumsy home-made trinkets, he’s a wonderful live toy to play with…Lots of fun!”

The Fred Harvey Company discontinued the Indian Detour program in 1931, as it had stopped being profitable after the Great Depression. By that time, however, the landscape of the Southwest had changed irreversibly due to the introduction of the automobile. The number of cars on American roads grew rapidly during the 1920s, and so did the amount of roads themselves; during the 1920s, the United States government spent more than one billion dollars on paving new roads annually. These roads, which snaked through the Southwest and connected previously isolated Indian lands to major roadways, allowed adventurous tourists to push deeper and deeper into Indian territory.

Many visitors came to these “national playgrounds” to observe Native American religious and ceremonial rituals. During the 1920s, one of the most popular tourist attractions in the Southwest was the Hopi Snake Dance. The dance, which concluded seven days of religious celebration every summer, appealed to tourists because of its beauty, exoticness, and apparent danger; during much of the ritual, dancers held venomous snakes. Due to an influx of Anglo visitors disrupting the proceedings, the Hopi had to ban sketching and photography during the event. In 1924, the Los Angeles Times reported that hundreds of Anglo visitors had descended upon the Hopi land to observe the spectacle of the Indians’ “strange tribute to gods of rain.” In 1928, American humorist Will Rogers visited the snake dance and remarked, “You will hear Americans say, ‘O it is just a commercial thing now.’ I don’t know where they get the idea…The

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210 Howard, 131.
211 Ibid., 128.
Indians could have very easily sold seats to the dance on the tops of their houses, for there must have been 25 hundred so-called white people there.” He spoke satirically about the vendors and concession stands selling ice cream and chili for white spectators. Rogers’ commentary exemplifies the highly commercialized nature of the Snake Dance; once a sacred religious ritual, by the end of the 1920s it had become a tourist spectacle. Eventually, the Hopi tribe banned visitors from attending the dance altogether.

The prospect of buying Native American crafts from the Indians themselves was also a pull for tourists. According to one New York Times article from 1937, “Tourists spend enormous sums in Santa Fe, and in the various Indian villages near it, for Indian works of art…Lots of easterners get inspiration for a whole Indian room.” Common Native American crafts were silver and turquoise jewelry, blankets, weavings, and pottery. In 1931, the Los Angeles Times advertised an upcoming showcase in which Navajo and San Ysidro Indians would make traditional weavings and pottery from start to finish for crowds of non-Native visitors. According to the article, the artisans would be in their traditional Native clothing, and tourists would get a rare behind-the-scenes glimpse of the making of authentic Native American handicrafts. The display was free to the public, and it was intended to “foster interest in the age-old handcrafts of the earliest Americans.”

As Anglos flooded into Native American reservations and became increasingly enthralled by Native handicrafts, the crafts themselves often became commercialized, just like the Hopi snake dance had. One example is the Navajo spoon, a common turn-of-the-century Indian souvenir. Because of its lightness, small size, and functionality, the Navajo spoon was very

215 Dilworth, Imagining Indians in the Southwest, 23.
popular among transcontinental railroad travelers who wanted to bring a souvenir home from Indian Country. Over the years, Navajo artisans changed the design and shape of their spoons depending on the tastes of the tourists who bought them. In the 1910s, the Navajo began to create and sell spoons with engravings of profiles of Navajos in traditional native garb. Generally, the engravings featured braided hair and feathered headdresses. Cindra Kline, author of *Navajo Spoons: Indian Artistry and the Souvenir Trade, 1880s-1940s*, argues that the use of feather headdresses as imagery on spoons represented an attempt to “acquiesce to Anglicized preconceptions and misconceptions.” The Navajo headdresses were, in reality, worn very infrequently; it was only customary for chiefs to wear them on very specific occasions. However, the Native Americans depicted on postcards or those who met tourists on train platforms were always wearing Navajo headdresses, and as tourists flooded into Indian Country, the headdresses became a symbol of Indian culture that became very marketable as an engraving on a spoon souvenir.

Some Indians reacted negatively to the Anglos who visited their reservations. In 1929, the *New York Times* published an interview with a Native American weaver named Henry Nappy. Nappy told the story of a white tourist who approached him impudently and asked about the blanket he was weaving. Nappy said, “She think me heap fool – I don’t tell her about my blanket.” This anecdote shows the impropriety displayed by many tourists who visited Indian reservations looking for crafts and goods. Tourists viewed Natives as attractions or curiosities, there for their own amusement and consumption. In 1937, a delegation of Navajo Indians traveled to Washington, D.C. to speak before the Senate Indian Affairs Committee. The delegates asserted that the Southwest was “being turned into a zoo for Eastern tourists.”

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218 Kline, 19.
219 Ibid., 80.
also bemoaned tourists’ “waste and extravagance...while some of our Indians still eat prairie
dogs for lack of food.” One of the delegates’ biggest complaints was the Indian Services’ school
system, which taught children traditional Navajo stories and dances but not basic reading or
writing. These grievances suggest that both tourists and lawmakers viewed Natives not as
modern actors but as curiosities, and that they were willing to turn a blind eye to the day-to-day
hardships that Natives suffered on reservations.

In order to understand the growth in the market for Native American tourism, one must
understand the various social and cultural phenomena that compelled Anglo Americans in the
early twentieth century to travel to Indian Country. One such factor was the development and
modernization of the American West, and the resulting nostalgia that many turn-of-the-century
Americans felt for America’s frontier past. In 1893, American essayist Frederick Jackson Turner
published an influential article entitled, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.”
In the essay, Turner argued that by the end of the nineteenth century, America’s frontier era
would come to an end. Indeed, according to the U.S. Census of 1890, “at present the unsettled
area has been so broken into by isolated bodies of settlement that there can hardly be said to be a
frontier line.” The proliferation of settlements all the way across the country, according to
Turner, “[marked] the closing of a great historic movement.” For Turner, and for many
Americans, the frontier represented characteristics that were quintessentially and wonderfully
American: independence, fortitude, and a continual process of rebirth. Americans who lived in
the Eastern portion of the country knew of the West’s charm and allure through photographs,
paintings, and written records of the frontier land’s natural beauty and Native American

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The frontier era and visual or written representations of the frontier inspired in early twentieth-century Americans a powerful sense of nostalgia for the nation’s colonial past. This new ‘frontier nostalgia’ coincided with the development of America’s transcontinental railroad system in the 1880s. Businesses like the Fred Harvey Company and the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad Company tried to boost profits by playing upon Americans’ desire to visit the Southwest. They formulated a new vision of the Southwest, which commonly included representations of Native Americans as charming, primitive, and exotic. Thus, Native Americans were re-conceptualized by Anglos in the early twentieth century to represent the simplicity and idyll of America’s bygone frontier past. A visit to Indian Country was marketed as an escape from the rigors and stresses of modern life. For example, the cover of the first Indian Detour brochure, published by the Fred Harvey Company in 1929, depicts a sole Indian figure sitting on a rock formation with a blanket and a piece of patterned pottery. In the distance is a mountain and a site of Indian ruins; there are no traces of ‘white civilization’ except for the Harvey car driving by on unpaved desert. The scene evokes total detachment from modernity and gives the viewer the sense that the riders in the Harvey car have somehow been transported into another world, where Natives live idyllically and peacefully among nature. This was the type of experience that tourists hoped to have when they traveled to the Southwest.

Another factor that drew Americans to the Southwest was a new strain of anti-modernism that pervaded middle-class American society in the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. In his book, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American

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224 Weigle, 115.
225 Dilworth, *Imagining Indians in the Southwest*, 4-6.
Culture, 1880-1920, T. J. Jackson Lears examines this cultural phenomenon. According to Lears, Americans at the turn of the twentieth century felt trapped within a sterile modern world that felt almost unreal. In a word, they felt that their lives had become “overcivilized.”227 In response to these feelings of alienation, many Americans, particularly educated elites and the middle class, rejected modernity and exalted intense physical and spiritual experiences.228 They valued authenticity as an end in itself and attached a great importance to vitality, spontaneity, and emotion. In their quest to discover real life, many people “sought authentic experience in the physical or emotional intensity of an imagined premodern past.”229 These anti-modern tendencies also led to an idealization of manual labor, a critique of modern work, and a revival of handicrafts. During the late nineteenth century, many Americans celebrated the figure of the pre-modern artisan, whose work was “a model of hardness and wholeness.” The humble, simple Native American craftsman was a central figure in the anti-modernist movement.230

Therefore, by the 1920s, American tourists had developed a desire to view Native American cultures in a way that mimicked the Columbian experience of discovery; that is to say, they wanted an “authentic” view of pure, natural Native American civilizations, untainted by modernity.231 Tourists wanted to believe that they were experiencing Indians’ day-to-day lives as they had been for centuries. One can look at advertisements and reviews for Fred Harvey’s popular Indian Detour to observe the desires of tourists to get an authentic taste of Native Americans’ “primitive” lifestyles. An article in the Los Angeles Times from 1926 stated that the pueblos visited on an Indian Detour “are inhabited by a dozen or more different Indian tribes and

228 Ibid., xiv.
229 Ibid., 58,70.
230 Ibid., 60.
231 Dilworth Imagining Indians in the Southwest, 2.
their life and mode of living today are practically the same as they were 300 years ago.”232 One ad published in the New York Times proudly proclaimed, “There were no Harveycars at Puye Cliff Dwellings thirty years ago—but this is 1927!”233 Above the caption was a picture of several Anglo men standing near a car, observing an Indian ruin. Harvey’s Indian Detours claimed to place tourists straight in the middle of authentic, timeless Indian societies—but with all of the comfort and convenience of modern amenities.

Not everyone approved of the Indian Detours and other similar tourist endeavors. As the Indian Detours—and Southwestern Indian tourism in general—gained popularity, people like John Collier began to worry about the detrimental effects of so much tourism on Indian culture. He was anxious that the sudden influx of tourists would degrade traditional Native arts and crafts and the integrity and purity of Native American culture. He also rejected the sale of “tourist art” within Native American villages, claiming that it was not representative of traditional Native artwork.234 Collier’s fears, however well-intentioned, represent a different kind of cultural imperialism. His desire to preserve pure, untainted Native cultures denied Native Americans a place in modern society and relegated them to an eternal past as mere relics or artifacts, rather than modern actors.

Some people disagreed with Collier and pushed back against his conceptualization of Native Americans as curiosities. Anna Wilmarth Ickes, wife of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes (1933-1946), took issue with the surge in Native American tourism and the way that tourists treated the Natives they encountered. In 1933, when her husband began to serve as Secretary of the Interior, Anna published a travelogue entitled, Mesa Land: The History and Romance of the American Southwest. She spoke

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234 McLerran, 26-27.
disdainfully of casual tourists who “cling to the highroads and the comfortable Harvey Houses,” and encouraged visitors to view Indians “not merely as a bit of local color, not as a romantic or grotesque figure…but as a man among men…and a present day comrade on our continent.”

Despite her seemingly enlightened take on Native American tourism, Ickes falls into many of the pitfalls that she herself describes. Later in the memoir, Ickes spoke of “two Zuni caciques…their faces seamed with age and dark with years of sun, yet bearing the unmistakable mark of serenity that comes from a life concentrated on things far from the material irritations of every day.”

The Navajo men she encountered were “aged medicine-men sitting in front of their hogans today with the deep spiritual insight of the patriarchs of old.” In her writing, Ickes lets her own preconceived notions of Native American life color the scenes she saw before her eyes. She may not have ridden in a Harveycar, but in many ways Ickes romanticized Native American culture just like the Fred Harvey Company and the railroad companies. Ickes’s memoir reflects the anti-modernism that pervaded middle-class American sensibilities at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The desire for wholeness, realness, and authenticity that Lears discusses in No Place of Grace comes through in several places in Ickes’s memoir, such as when she urges visitors to the Southwest to slow down and “get the real feel of the country which is missed by speeding motorists.”

Ickes also discusses at length her experience at a Navajo religious ceremony called the Mountain Chant, which spanned several days and included a variety of dances and performances. Upon entering a Navajo Hogan, Ickes remarked, “When

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236 Ibid., 14.
237 Ibid., 62.
238 Ibid., 14.
we slipped under the blanket hanging over the door, we seemed to step right out of any world we had ever known before. Could this be America in 1927?”

Ickes’s memoir also exemplifies the exaltation of handicrafts and pre-modern artisanal labor that Lears discusses in *No Place of Grace*. Ickes at one point remarked on the beauty and intricacy of Navajo blankets, and then said, “Unfortunately the beautiful blanket has been largely superseded for personal wear by the ‘Pendleton’ factory-made substitute, nearly as warm and much less costly. Men, women, and children wear these.” These factory-produced blankets were more affordable and nearly equal in utility, and yet for Ickes, their widespread use was “unfortunate.” Her word choice shows that she, like many of her contemporaries, thought that traditional artisanal craftsmanship was intrinsically important. As such, Ickes and other tourists disliked the idea that this supposedly pre-modern, primitive society had chosen to replace handiwork with factory labor. The very idea of this industrialized work conflicted with the idea of Natives as a ‘real,’ ‘authentic’ society separate from all the ills of modernity.

Despite tourists’ desire to see Indians in their ‘natural state,’ much as one views the animals at a zoo, it is clear that Native Americans did see and respond to the influx of tourism. They asserted their agency not only by their entry into the market economy, but in several other ways as well. For example, in 1932 the *Los Angeles Times* published, “What My Father Told Me,” an interview with a Navajo artist named Ralph Roanhorse. During the interview, Roanhorse tells an anecdote about being approached by a rude white tourist who wants to rent a horse. Roanhorse tells the man he can rent the horse for twenty-five dollars a day—a very large sum for such a servant—and then refuses to negotiate until the tourist leaves. Roanhorse goes on to say that such practices were not uncommon among Indians on reservations:

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239 Ibid., 73.
240 Ibid., 61.
The trader used to say that he could size up a tourist the minute he came into the store and tell just what he would have to pay for horses. The man who was courteous and not too quick in his speech could get them for $3; but the fellow who used what Americans call “high pressure” would have to pay $5 or more.

In this small way, Roanhorse and others like him were able to exercise their agency over white tourists.\(^\text{241}\) Natives also reacted to white tourists by fighting for their own legislation to protect their cultural heritage on their own terms. In 1934, a group of Hopi Indians in Arizona attempted to copyright all of their dances to stop “unscrupulous” whites and Natives who performed the sacred ceremonies for profit. The Hopis’ request followed a similar struggle by a group of Navajos who asked Collier for the right to prosecute Indians and whites who did unauthorized Navajo dances.\(^\text{242}\) In these ways, Natives pushed back against the whites who invaded their land and exercised their market power over Anglo tourists.

By the mid 1930s, tourism in the Southwestern region had continued to grow. Ironically, the influx of tourists was detrimental to the tourist experience in the Southwest; Anglos who came to Indian Country to escape modernity found that their spiritual experience was cheapened by the presence of other Anglos and by rapidly developing tourist infrastructure. Politicians like John Collier also disliked the rise in Native American tourism, fearing that it jeopardized the sanctity and purity of Native American arts and cultures. Collier rejected the art made for tourist shops as a lesser form of expression of Indian culture, and they claimed that tourism was to blame for the degradation of the quality of Native American artisanship.\(^\text{243}\) Although people like Collier deplored Natives’ entry in the market economy, by the late 1920s they could no longer avoid the abysmal economic status of Native Americans on reservations. In 1928, Lewis Meriam, along with the Institute for Government Research, presented to the Secretary of the


\(^{242}\) “Indian Dancers Hit Imitators,” Los Angeles Times, July 13, 1934, 7.

\(^{243}\) McLerran, 24, 27.
Meriam opened with the assertion that “an overwhelming majority of the Indians are poor, even extremely poor, and they are not adjusted to the economic and social system of the dominant white civilization.” The Meriam Report detailed the poor education and health care systems on reservations, criticized the Office of Indian Affairs, and gained the support of many Indian reform groups.

Thus, the government passed the Indian Arts and Crafts Act in 1935. According to L. C. West, the general manager of the Indian Arts and Crafts board, the purpose of the act was to “improve the quality of Indian craftsmanship, to suggest changes that will make it more salable, to protect it from the competition of inferior substitutes.” West affirmed that the market for Indian crafts had been saturated by poor knockoffs and substitutes, sold in gas stations and roadside curio shops to unsuspecting tourists who did not know any better. By passing the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, according to West, the U.S. government hoped to recreate a market for fine, authentic Indian art in the form of high-quality blankets, rugs, pottery, and jewelry. He wanted to make Natives competitive in the arts and crafts market once more. A new market for quality, handmade Native goods would supposedly pull Native Americans out of their current state of depression and economic hardship and turn them into a “self-respecting and self-supporting people.”

John Collier made similar statements in a 1935 New York Times article. Collier said of the Act, “Our design is to plow up the Indian soul, to make the Indian again the master of his own mind.” He cited the Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), only a year old, as

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246 Snipp and Summers, 161.
247 “Indian Tribes Arts and Crafts Market Sought,” Washington Post, November 1, 1936, M3.
another example of the government trying to help Indians become economically and politically successful. The Indian Reorganization Act reversed the Dawes Act of 1887 and granted Native Americans rights to lost land, as well as the right of self-determination. Additionally, it provided Indians with scholarships and with credit for farm or industrial products. For Collier, the Indian Arts and Crafts Act was a further step in reinvigorating Indian society.248

The motives behind the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, however, are not as simple and selfless as these articles might suggest. The rhetoric employed by politicians like Collier and West, as well as by the authors of the newspaper articles who quoted them, implies that guilt played a significant factor in the development of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act. An author from the Washington Post wrote, “The value of the Indian arts and crafts has degenerated chiefly because…white teachers have made the mistake of trying to educate the redman away from his art. For decades Indians were urged to forget their own culture and to try to make themselves over into white men.”249 In the 1920s and 1930s, Americans had come to view Native cultures as somehow important, although still not fully equal to white culture. The Indian Arts and Crafts Act was a way for them to atone for and attempt to reverse the cultural damage they had inflicted for the last several centuries. Frank Ernest Hill, who wrote for the New York Times, said that “the destruction of a pueblo is a barbarous thing. America is coming to understand this.”250 Half a century ago, the casual destruction of Native American cultures would not have been seen as a problem by many Americans. By the 1930s, however, Native Americans had gone from barbarians to curiosities to romantic figures whose cultures ought to be exalted and celebrated. This shift in cultural values and consumer tastes compelled Anglos to try to reverse the damage they had inflicted through the passage of legislation like the Indian Arts and Crafts Act.

249 “Indian Tribes Arts and Crafts Market Sought,” M3.
250 Hill, SM10.
Primitivism and anti-modernism also played a factor in Anglos’ changing views of Native Americans. In “Handmade by an American Indian: Souvenirs and the Cultural Economy of Southwestern Tourism,” Leah Dilworth challenges the view that before tourism, Indian crafts had been made solely for personal, religious, or symbolic reasons. According to Dilworth, Native American craftsmen and women had been involved in the market economy with traders, visitors, and members of other tribes well before the influx of tourists in the early twentieth century. However, primitivists and anti-modernists did not wish to acknowledge the fact that Indians actually “saw” tourists and responded to them; instead, they wished to see Native Americans as existing within a hermetically-sealed bubble, separated from the modern world and all of its influences. As such, tourists lamented the ways that Native Americans changed their artwork to appeal to modern tastes and trends, and they ascribed more value to objects that did not appear to be specifically intended for the tourist market. According to anthropologist Nancy Parezo, tourists categorize Native-made goods into a hierarchy based on the supposed authenticity of the object. At the top of the hierarchy are ethnographic or archaeological specimens. Next on the hierarchy is fine Indian art, followed by Indian handicrafts. Parezo says that the “lowliest” of all Indian-made crafts are souvenirs, which she defines as anything made specifically for the tourist market. To a primitivist or anti-modernist, tourist goods are not authentic; they are not “singular,” “handmade,” or “detailed.”

Buying a good intended for tourist consumption negates the reason why tourists came to the Southwest in the 1920s and 1930s: to escape modernity, reconnect with something “real,” and witness authentic, primitive Native American cultures in all their glory. The Indian Arts and Crafts Act promised tourists that they would get what they paid for. As L. C. West said,

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The average customer doesn’t know the difference. He goes into a shop and asks for a handmade Indian bracelet or ring. Sometimes he gets it; more often his attention is directed to a factory product… An authentic Indian piece of jewelry cannot compete in price with the other, but when a man wants real turquoise and real silver, made by Indian hands, he should be protected against having a substitute forced on him.\textsuperscript{252}

From West’s point of view, the purpose of the IACA was to protect unsuspecting white tourists—not downtrodden Indian artisans. The official rhetoric of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act may have emphasized the need to bolster craft sales for Indians and preserve Native American culture for the good of the country and for Natives themselves, but the IACA was also heavily influenced by the desires of tourists, who wanted to get their money’s worth in authentic spiritual and cultural experiences. Some, like John Collier and Anna Ickes, wished so badly to preserve the purity of Native American culture that they objectified Native Americans in a more subtle way.

Long after the passage of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, tourists have continued to visit Native American reservations in search of spirituality and authenticity. Followers of the New Age movement in the 1990s visited Native American reservations seeking profound mystical experiences, much in the same way that tourists traveling to the Southwest in the 1920s and 1930s searched for some semblance of “realness” among the primitive cultures of the Native Americans. In 1993, Leigh Jenkins, the director of the Office of Culture Preservation for the Hopi tribe, responded to these tourists. He said, “We recognize that there’s a great deal of yearning for spirituality out there. With all the madness in the country, people are looking for something to fill the vacuum. And, of course, they think we’re exotic. But it’s wrong to simply impose yourself on someone else’s religion.”\textsuperscript{253}

\textsuperscript{252} “Indian Tribes Arts and Crafts Market Sought,” M3.
Accordingly, the late twentieth century saw a new influx of “authentic” Native American goods mass-produced in Mexico, China, and the Philippines.\textsuperscript{254} Perhaps in response to the renewed interest in Native American tourism, as well as these new threats to the Native handicraft market, the U.S. Department of the Interior updated the Indian Arts and Crafts Act in 1990 to call for harsher penalties for those who knowingly sold fake Native American goods.\textsuperscript{255} However, Gail Sheffield argues that the legislation remained socially flawed and overly simplistic in its definition of “Indian” and “Indian tribe.” Six decades later, the act still fails to account for complex tribal identities and ever-changing notions of what it means to be “authentically” Native American.\textsuperscript{256}

Examining the behavior of travelers—where they go, what they see, and why—can provide interesting insights into these individuals’ values and desires. Trends in the behavior of tourists offer a lens into the overarching ideals and dreams of a society. Therefore, studying the Native American tourism industry in the early twentieth century helps scholars understand the emotional and spiritual impetus behind the passage of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act. Tourist advertisements and memoirs created in the 1920s and 1930s reveal the yearning, the guilt, and the nostalgia that drew Anglo tourists to the enchanted lands of the Southwest—and that compelled them to preserve it.

\textsuperscript{254} Sheffield, 3.  
\textsuperscript{255} Hapiuk, 1018.  
\textsuperscript{256} Sheffield, 8-10.
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In this controversial new book, Norman Naimark addresses the phenomena of genocide in the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin’s leadership. Although Naimark readily admits that there was no single act of Soviet genocide, he contends that Stalin’s mass killings of “class enemies” and “enemies of the people” in the 1930s should indeed be defined as genocidal by the United Nations. Thus, in the first part of the book, he takes readers on a journey with lawyer Raphael Lemkin and his quest to have genocide recognized as an international war crime by the U.N after World War II. Although the U.N’s final definition of genocide omitted political groups of the type that Stalin oppressed, Naimark points out that early drafts included it and were later dropped due to Soviet pressure. He also contends that cases in the International Criminal Tribunal regarding Serbian war crimes in the 1990s illustrate a new approach to dealing with war criminals. Naimark takes these rulings along with recent cases in Lithuania where former Soviet officials have been convicted of war crimes, and argues that the precedents should be used against Joseph Stalin.

In the rest of the book, Naimark examines Stalin’s genocidal acts, from Dekulakization (the Soviet policy of peasant removal from 1929-32) and the Holodomor (the Ukrainian Famine), to the repression of minorities and the Great Terror. According to Naimark, Dekulakization and the Great Terror can be viewed as genocidal due to Stalin’s creation of invented groups of alleged socialist enemies, with the objective of eliminating them and everyone associated with them from the country. Additionally, Naimark argues that Stalin understood hundreds of thousands of innocent people would be killed in the destruction of the Kulaks and the Old Bolsheviks, but did nothing to stem the widespread murder.

Although terming the Holodomor as genocide still lacks a consensus from scholars and legislatures around the world, Naimark’s section on the Ukrainian Famine appears to be his most persuasive. Naimark contends that the Soviet refusal to relax restrictions on grain delivery to Ukraine and their prevention of Ukrainian peasants from seeking food in cities or elsewhere in the USSR should be defined as genocide. For Naimark, Stalin’s historical hostility to Ukrainians and the peasant’s resistance of collectivization fueled Soviet policy towards the country.

In terms of form, Naimark’s work is as unorthodox as it is refreshing. By no means does Naimark attempt to simplify the complexity of Stalin’s mass crimes, but his accessible writing style engages the general public as well as academics. Additionally, Naimark presents his work as if he himself were the lead prosecutor in a war crimes trial. Through this technique, Naimark offers only evidence that he believes would be acceptable in a courtroom, and his categorical approach to offering this evidence chapter by chapter captures—and holds—readers’ attention.

While Naimark makes numerous provocative and informative assertions in his new work, the foundation of his entire effort is that the definition of genocide needs to be broadened to include political groups. While there is room for expansion on this argument given that the book is fairly short, Naimark can be commended for a well-researched, comprehensive, and convincing study on the murderous and controversial policies of Joseph Stalin.

Douglas McKnight
The University of Oklahoma